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Abstract 
 
This thesis analysed the development of international trade patterns during the period 
from 1980 to 2013. More specifically, the research focused on the structure of North-
South relations during this period and how China has influenced its dynamic. The 
legacy of colonialism left behind a particlar configuration of international trade, which 
was highly disadvantageous for the countries of the global South. This ‘core-periphery 
trade structure’ proved resilient in the decades following decolonisation, reinforcing the 
South’s subordinate position in the world economy. This research used the gravity 
model of international trade to trace the development of this trade structure over the last 
three and a half decades. The research found that patterns of international trade 
continued to reflect the structural legacy of colonialism throughout most of the 
twentieth century. However, this structure dissolved around the turn of the millennium 
as South-South trade started to grow and the North lost its centrality. The growing 
weight of China in the world economy was an important part of this development. 
However, the growth of South-South trade is not only a reorientation towards China. It 
also reflects a system-wide transformation towards a more balanced international trade 
structure. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the central questions in contemporary scholarship in International Relations concerns 
the ‘rise of China’ to become a major power in the world. There is much disagreement on the 
nature and extent of China’s rise, as well as on the implications this has for different spheres 
of world politics and economics. This thesis attempts to contribute to this debate by 
addressing a particular aspect of China’s growing weight in the world: its impact on patterns 
of international trade, with particular attention to the structure of North-South relations.  
 The structure of the world economy that came into existence during colonial times can 
be described as a core-periphery structure, in which inequalities between North and South 
were maintained through the use of force. This structure served to further the economic 
interests of the core at the expense of societies on the periphery. Although the political 
structures of imperialism were largely dismantled in the decades following the end of World 
War II, the economic features of the core-periphery structure proved resilient in the years 
following independence. One of the economic features of this core-periphery structure was 
that states in the North were at the centre of international trade. Not only did the North 
account for the bulk of world trade in terms of value, but it also had extensive trade 
relationships with all parts of the globe. The countries of the South, however, had a much 
more concentrated portfolio of trade partners, trading almost exclusively with the economies 
in the North. 
 This core-periphery trade structure left the states in the South in a vulnerable position 
against the North. Their different levels of ‘trade concentration’ conferred a strategically 
stronger position on the states in the North, as they simply had more alternatives in 
international trade. The states of the South were more ‘dependent’ on the North than the states 
in the North were on them. This inevitably had negative consequences for the South’s terms 
of trade – as, indeed, it had during colonial times. The states of the global South were very 
well aware of their vulnerable position in the international trade structure and tried various 
strategies to alleviate it. Most importantly, they encouraged the formation of South-South 
trade linkages, which had been almost completely absent in the traditional core-periphery 
trade structure. However, the formation of such trade networks would take time, not least 
because the structure of economies in the South were highly influenced by the legacy of 
colonialism. They were geared towards producing primary products and raw materials for 
export to the North, often in competition with one another. Furthermore, their relative poverty 
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compared to the North, made the prospects of South-South trade less than feasible at the time 
of independence. 
 Nevertheless, there are indications that the structure of international trade has started to 
change in recent years. Countries in the global South account for an ever-greater share of 
world trade and are increasingly trading directly with each other. The trajectory of China is 
particularly important in this respect, as its rapid economic growth in recent decades has 
substantially altered the balance of the world economy. China is today the largest trading 
nation in world and has extensive trade relations with all parts of the world economy. For 
example, in 2011 China became the single largest trade partner of the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This would have been unthinkable only two decades before when Sub-Saharan Africa 
conducted the vast majority of its trade with countries in the North.1 
 However, the growing weight of China in the developing world has also raised 
suspicions. Some scholars argue that China is becoming a new ‘core’ in the global South, 
assuming many of the same roles previously played by the colonial powers in the North. 
According to this reading, the current transformation of the global economy is not so much 
about the empowerment of the global South, as it is about the repositioning of the core 
towards the East. China, for its part, presents itself as a champion of the global South and 
claims that its economic rise empowers the developing world more generally. It strongly 
denies accusations that its engagement in other parts of the global South resembles the 
colonial practices of earlier times. Instead it emphasises its own identity as a developing 
country and frames its engagement in the global South as the cooperation between equals. 
 There are many sides to this issue and many ways to address it. This thesis attempts to 
contribute to the debate by analysing patterns of international trade in the period from 1980 to 
2013. More specifically, the aim is to systematically assess the structure of international trade 
during this period, using the gravity model of international trade. The advantage of using the 
gravity model for this purpose is that it moves beyond simple observations of trade values and 
main trading partners. The gravity model allows for the assessment of international trade 
patterns after taking into account the size of the economies involved and the geographical 
distance between them. As such it provides a useful baseline against which to compare actual 
values of international trade. By using this method, it is possible to make more plausible 
claims about ‘trade structures’ and their development over time. 
 The research questions that guide the research can be formulated as follows: 
                                                
1 Paolo Drummond and Estelle Xue Liu, “Africa’s Rising Exposure to China: How Large Are Spillovers 
Through Trade?” Working Paper 13/250 (International Monetary Fund, 2013), p. 7. 
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• Was there still a core-periphery structure to international trade in the early part of the 
research period? 
• How did the international trade structure develop during the research period? 
• What role did China play in this development?  
 
The following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the research and puts it into 
context with the relevant literature. It starts by explaining how the world economy took on a 
core-periphery structure during colonial times and how the economic features of this structure 
persisted into the contemporary era. Particular attention is paid to patterns of international 
trade in a core-periphery system, drawing on Johan Galtung’s structural theory of 
imperialism. Next, the chapter turns to theories of International Relations and how they 
approach the world economy and its division into core and periphery. The theoretical 
framework of this research is heavily influenced by structuralist strands of International 
Relations theory, particularly dependency theory and world-systems analysis. These theories 
see the world economy as a driving force in international relations, and see the North and 
South as having substantially different interests in this structure. The rapid economic rise of 
China is analysed in this context, especially its engagement with the global South. 
Furthermore, the chapter takes the aforementioned research questions and formulates them 
into three separate hypotheses based on theory and the existing literature. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the 
research.  
 Chapter three introduces the gravity model of international trade and explains how it 
was used to assess patterns of international trade over time. The chapter also explains the 
empirical work behind the thesis: the collection of data and its compilation into a gravity 
model database. Finally, the chapter explains how the models were estimated and how 
relevant indicators were obtained in order to answer the research questions. Chapter four 
introduces the empirical results of the thesis. It is divided into three parts, each of which 
attempts to assess one of three hypothesis. Chapter five discusses the theoretical implications 
of the results and how they contribute to the literature on China’s rise and its influence on the 
structure North-South relations. Finally, chapter six draws together the conclusions.  
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2.  Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
This research draws on two separate but interrelated literatures in International Relations. 
Firstly, the thesis draws on the literature on North-South relations, especially the economic 
aspect of that relationship. Secondly, it draws on the more focused literature on China’s 
engagement with the rest of the global South. However, as is argued in this thesis, these two 
issues are closely intertwined and cannot be properly understood in isolation from each other. 
China’s economy has grown immensely in recent decades and is today the largest in the world 
in terms of purchasing power parity.2 Furthermore, China has become the largest trading 
nation on earth and has a rapidly expanding presence in the economies of the global South.3 
Any analysis of the transformation of North-South relations must therefore pay close attention 
to the trajectory of China in recent decades. Conversely, it is impossible to understand 
China’s influence in the global South without placing it in the historical context of North-
South relations. The contemporary international system is still heavily influenced by the 
structural legacy of colonialism and China’s economic presence in the global South must be 
analysed in that context. 
 
2.1.  The Emergence and Persistence of a Core-Periphery World Order 
Core and periphery are a relational pair of concepts, which denote an unequal relationship 
with the former taking precedence over the latter. 4  The concepts have geographical 
connotations and can be used to analyse a wide variety of relationships at both the global and 
national levels. For the purposes of this thesis, the concepts will be used in their more 
widespread application: as a way of describing the division of the world into dominant and 
subordinated regions within a single structure of interaction.5  
 The concepts of core and periphery were first popularised as a way of describing the 
structure of the world economy by the Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch, in his analysis of 
                                                
2 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, (April 2015 edition),  Available at: 
[https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx], (accessed May 15, 2015).  
3 World Trade Organization, WTO Statistics Database, (2015) Available at [http://stat.wto.org], (accessed May 
15, 2015). 
4 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction, (Durham 2004) p. 93. 
5 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of 
International Relations, (Cambridge 2015), p. 172. 
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the economic development of Latin America.6 Prebisch argued that the division of labour in 
the world economy put the countries in the South (the periphery) at a structural disadvantage 
to countries in the North (the core). For Prebisch and other dependency theorists, the concepts 
of core and periphery are understood first and foremost in economic terms. However, in 
principle, they can be extended to other most spheres of social interaction. Indeed, the 
economic inequality of core-periphery relationships usually originates in – and is maintained 
by – other forms of subordination, such as political, military and ideational.7 
 Looking at the world at the beginning of the 20th century, it is not difficult to identify a 
core-periphery structure. A handful of European empires and their offshoots controlled 84% 
of the Earth’s territory and the majority of its peoples, through colonialism and other imperial 
practices. 8  This core-periphery structure transcended political, military, economic and 
ideational spheres. European states claimed sovereignty over large parts of the world as part 
of their empires; they occupied the commanding heights of an increasingly integrated world 
economy, extracting surplus value and raw materials from all over the globe; and they 
rationalised and legitimised their dominance through a collection of racist and Eurocentric 
ideologies of supposedly ‘universal’ nature. Finally, their superiority in military technologies 
and other coercive capabilities made them virtually unchallengeable and, thus, able to crush 
resistance and maintain the functioning of the world order to their own advantage.9  
 Buzan and Lawson argue that this core-periphery structure fully took form in the 19th 
century as European powers managed to project their power for the first time on a truly global 
scale. During what they term the ‘global transformation’, the core states “created an 
international ‘society of empires’ that subordinated indigenous people, sanctioning their 
dispossession and, on occasion, their genocide . . . The power inequality at the heart of this 
emergent core-periphery relationship was unprecedented in world history.”10 During the 
height of imperialism in the 19th century, 
[t]he core comprised most European states and their now independent settler colonies in the 
Americas. Its periphery was a mixture of colonies, largely absorbed into the sovereignty of their 
metropoles (most of Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia), and a handful of classical 
                                                
6 See e.g. Raúl Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, (New York 
1950). 
7 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, pp. 171-196. 
8 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800, 2nd edition, 
(Cambridge 1996), p. 5. 
9 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, pp. 171-196. 
10 Ibid., p. 171. 
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agrarian powers still strong enough to avoid colonisation, but weak enough to be treated as 
unequal (China, Iran, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Japan).11 
Other scholars trace the emergence of the core-periphery structure further back in time, 
claiming that it emerged already in the 16th century, as European powers started to colonise 
the Americas and establish outposts in Africa and Asia.12 Furthermore, the reasons for 
Europe’s ability to surge ahead and subordinate the rest of the world are still hotly debated. 
This thesis, however, does not seek to contribute this debate about the reasons for the ‘Great 
Divergence’ and when it took place.13 The important point to note here is that a core-
periphery structure had indisputably taken form in the second half of the 19th century. The 
concern of this thesis is to trace this structure forward in time, from the colonial era into the 
contemporary period.  
 Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to specify the economic features of the 
core-periphery structure. During colonial times, the states in the core imposed a division of 
labour on their colonies, which favoured the economic development of the core. Essentially, 
the core produced industrial goods and other high-value products for export to their colonies, 
as well as to other states in the core. The economies on the periphery, however, were focused 
on the production of primary products and raw materials for export to the core.14 The 
imposition of this division of labour often involved the forceful dispossession of people on 
the periphery, as well as the de-industrialisation of existing economies as they were 
incorporated into the European led world economy. 15  The subordinate position of the 
periphery was further compounded by unfavourable terms of trade and finance imposed on 
them by the core.16 
 This iniquitous economic relationship did not sustain itself, but was maintained by 
various forms of political control and violence.17 In the case of colonies, this simply took the 
form of direct political control from the metropoles and the crushing of any resistance.18 In the 
case of peripheral societies that remained nominally independent, hierarchical economic 
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 176. 
12 See e.g. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, (Berkeley 1974/2011). 
13 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, 
(Princeton 2000) 
14 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, (New York 2007), p. 62. 
15 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, p. 186.  
16 Ibid., p. 185. 
17 Anthony McGrew, “Organized Violence in the Making (and Remaking) of Globalization” in Globalization 
Theory: Approaches and Controversies, eds. Held and McGrew, (Cambridge 2007), pp. 15-24. 
18 Richard Gott, Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt, (London 2011). 
 7 
relations were imposed through the use of force or the threat thereof. China, for example, was 
only brought into this core-periphery structure after its defeat in the Opium Wars.19 The 
subsequent imposition of unequal treaties placed China squarely in a subordinate position to 
states in the core.20 
 This highly unequal international structure remained largely in place until the end of the 
Second World War. In the years that followed, however, the political structures of empire 
were gradually dismantled. European empires dissolved as the majority of the world’s peoples 
broke free from foreign domination and formed their own states.21 Western states had lost the 
ability to uphold the political structures of the core-periphery order and were increasingly 
unable to enforce their will through the use of force against societies in the South.22 
Furthermore, such practices were gradually delegitimised, as the principles of sovereign 
equality and self-determination were extended to societies in the global South.23 
 However, the core-periphery structure did not disappear with the dissolution of empire. 
Important features of it remained in place even as the core lost its political grip on societies on 
the periphery. In particular, the economic structures that had come into place during colonial 
times proved to be resilient. The newly independent states in the global South found 
themselves in a closely integrated world economy, the structure of which largely served the 
interests of the North.24 In addition to the deep inequalities of wealth and standards of living 
that colonialism had left behind, the economies of the South were largely organised according 
to the interests of their former colonisers.25 In spite of their formal political independence, 
many countries in the South found themselves in a subservient economic relationship with the 
North, from which it seemed difficult to break free.26 
 
                                                
19 Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century, (London 2007), pp. 340-342. 
See also Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the 
Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s, (Berkeley 1989/2011), pp. 167-168. 
20 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750, (London 2012), pp. 41-46, 50-56. See 
also Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd edition, (New York 1999), pp. 160-166. 
21 Len Scott, “International history 1900-99” in The Globalization of World Politics, 6th edition, eds. Baylis, 
Smith and Owens, (Oxford 2014), p. 53. 
22 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, pp. 198-219. 
23 Scott, “International history 1900-99”, p. 53. 
24 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, p. 189. 
25 Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, pp. 55-56. 
26 Prashad, The Darker Nations, p. 62-74. 
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2.2.  Patterns of Trade in a Core-Periphery Structure 
In a landmark essay published in 1971, Johan Galtung laid out his “structural theory of 
imperialism”.27 Among other things, the article introduced Galtung’s “feudal centre-periphery 
structure”, which explains how units interact in core-periphery system.28 This model is of 
particular interest for this thesis, because it lays out the structure of international trade in a 
core-periphery structure.  
 
Figure 1: Johan Galtung’s “feudal centre-periphery structure”. The model shows the structure of 
interaction in a core-periphery system. The “C”s represent states in the core, whereas the “P”s 
represent societies on the periphery.29 
 
Figure 1 depicts Galtung’s feudal core-periphery model, showing the interaction structure 
between four core states and nine peripheral states. According to Galtung, the feudal 
interaction structure serves to protect the dominant position of the core by placing it in a 
‘strategically strong position’ vis-à-vis the periphery. One of the economic features of this 
structure, is that core and peripheral states have a very different ‘concentration of trade 
partners’. 
A Periphery nation should . . . have most of its trade with ‘its’ Center nation. In other words, 
empirically we would expect high levels of import concentration as well as export 
concentration in the Periphery, as opposed to the Center, which is more free to extend its trade 
                                                
27 Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism” Journal of Peace Research 2 (1971). 
28 Galtung uses the terms “centre-periphery” instead of “core-periphery”. However, they essentially mean the 
same thing. In order to avoid confusion, this thesis will stick to the term core when discussing Galtung’s work.  
29 The figure is directly reproduced from Galtung’s original article: Galtung, “A Structural Theory of 
Imperialism” Journal of Peace Research, p. 89. 
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relations in almost any direction – except in the pure case, with the periphery of other Center 
nations.30 
This different concentration of trade partners puts the peripheral states in a strategically weak 
position, as they are much more dependent on their trade with the core than the core is on its 
trade with them. This means that the states on the periphery often have no choice but to accept 
the terms of trade offered to them by the core state, as they simply have no alternative. The 
states in the core, on the other hand, have many different trade relationships with states in 
both the core and the periphery, and therefore do not face the same dilemma.  
 It is worth reminding that Galtung’s model was devised to explain interactions in a 
world of empires and their colonies. His model explains interactions in a core-periphery 
structure where the states in the core have direct control over their peripheries and their 
economic decisions. As such, it is fairly accurate in describing the structure of international 
trade during colonial times, when countries on the periphery traded mostly with their 
metropoles in Europe.  
 However, when European empires began to dissolve in the mid 20th century, their 
former colonies could not be forced to continue trading exclusively with their former 
colonisers. By becoming independent, the states in the global South had presumably managed 
to escape the dilemmas posed by the feudal interaction structure. However, as previously 
noted, the economic features of the core-periphery structure proved to be more resilient than 
its political attributes. This was reflected in the continuation of core-periphery patterns of 
international trade in the decades following independence. States in the North remained at the 
centre of international trade, trading extensively with all regions of the world economy.31 
Indeed, in 1964 the top six economies in the core accounted for 70% of world trade.32 
Countries on the periphery, however, continued to have a relatively tight concentration of 
trade partners, exporting most of their products to the core.33 
 The main concern of this research is to assess the development of this trade structure in 
the period from 1980 to 2013. More specifically, the question is to what extent was the core-
periphery structure of international trade was still in place at the beginning of the period, and 
how it has developed since. In order to assess this, Galtung’s feudal interaction structure will 
                                                
30 Ibid., p. 90 [emphasis in original]. 
31 Roger J. Nemeth and David A. Smith, “International Trade and World-System Structure: A Multiple Network 
Analysis” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 4 (1985): p. 525. 
32 John Toye, “Assessing the G77: 50 years after UNCTAD and 40 years after the NIEO” Third World Quarterly 
10 (2014): p. 1761. 
33 Matthew C. Mahutga, “The Persistence of Structural Inequality? A Network Analysis of International Trade 
1965-2000” Social Forces 4 (2006): p. 1867. 
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be used as an ideal-typical model of a core-periphery trade structure, albeit with one minor 
modification: the condition that each peripheral state just trade with one state in the core is 
dropped, and replaced by the condition that states on the periphery trade almost exclusively 
with the core in general. This modification has two reasons. Firstly, some peripheral states 
like China never had a single trade partner in the core that absorbed all of its exports. It would 
therefore be difficult to analyse the trade of those states in the strict version of Galtung’s 
model. Secondly, it more closely resembles the reality faced by states in the global South at 
time of independence. They were structurally predisposed to engage in trade with the core, 
but were no longer forced to trade exclusively with one state. Instead they could diversify 
their partners to include other states in the core. However, the core is relatively small and 
cohesive compared to the periphery. This additional freedom therefore constituted only a 
minor improvement in the bargaining position of the periphery. The main problem remained, 
which was the almost complete lack of trade between states on the periphery, also known as 
South-South trade.  
 The core-periphery structure of international trade as it is defined in this research is, 
thus, characterised by the following features: 
A. States in the core occupy a central position in the trade structure, trading extensively 
amongst themselves as well as with states on the periphery 
B. States on the periphery trade with states in the core but have little trade amongst 
themselves 
As in Galtung’s original model, this places the states in the core in a strategically stronger 
position than the states on the periphery. It is therefore not surprising that states in the global 
South have actively tried to promote South-South trade since the time of independence in 
order to reduce their dependence on the core. To some extent, this research can be seen as an 
attempt to assess how successful they were in this endeavour. 
 
2.3.  Core and Periphery in International Relations Theory 
Theories of International Relations treat the concepts of core and periphery in very different 
ways. While most scholars would accept the existence of a core and periphery – especially 
during colonial times – they have radically different assumptions about its importance. This 
section discusses how the three main strands of international relations theory approach the 
core-periphery structure and explains the theoretical framework that informs this research.  
 11 
 The most prominent tradition of IR theory, Realism, in fact has very little to say about 
core and periphery.34 Realists view all states as essentially undifferentiated units in an 
international system characterised by anarchy.35 The primary concern of all states is to 
safeguard their security vis-à-vis other states in order to secure their survival.36 The only 
difference between states – and the only variable of consequence – is their ‘distribution of 
power’ in the international system.37 As far as realists are concerned, there was no systematic 
difference between the newly independent states of the global South and their former 
colonisers in the North, except that the former tended to be weak states with few capabilities. 
There are no ‘common interests’ among developing countries in the international system by 
virtue of their common economic predicament.38 Indeed, economic considerations are almost 
wholly absent from the framework of Realism, which considers them of secondary 
importance to security interests.39 The concepts of core and periphery are therefore considered 
to be more or less irrelevant in the eyes of Realists. Perhaps they are valid descriptions to 
some extent, but they are not considered to be of consequence to the conduct of foreign 
affairs. However, as the following analysis will make clear, the economic legacies of 
colonialism were high in the agenda of many countries in the South in the years following 
independence. The inability if Realism to account for this economic dynamic of North-South 
relations, therefore makes it ill-suited for analysing the topic of this thesis.   
 Contrary to Realism, the theory of liberalism in IR puts a lot of emphasis on economic 
issues in explaining world politics. The foreign policies of states, according to liberalists, are 
heavily influenced by economic considerations. Economic interdependence, for example, is 
considered to reduce the likelihood of conflict between states.40 However, in spite of this 
economic predisposition, the concepts of core and periphery tend to be conspicuously absent 
                                                
34 Realist theory breaks down into several strands (e.g. classical realism, structural realism and neo-classial 
realism). However, they all share the same core elements and all share the same limitatons when it comes to 
addressing core and periphery. For an overview of Realist theory, see: Jack Donnelly, “Realism” in Theories of 
International Relations, 4th edition, eds. Burchill et al. (Hampshire 2009). 
35 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading 1979), p. 93. 
36 Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics is not Foreign Policy” Security Studies 1 (1996): p. 54.  
37 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism” in The Globalization of World Politics, 6th edition, eds. Baylis, 
Smith and Owens, (Oxford 2014), pp. 103-106. 
38 Chris Alden, Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira, The South in World Politics, (Hampshire 2010), pp. 9-
10. 
39 Seyom Brown, “The Higher Realism: A US Forieign Policy for Transcending the North-South Divide” in 
North and South in the World Political Economy, eds. Reuveny and Thompson, (Oxford 2008), p. 368. 
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from liberal accounts of world politics as well.41 Arguably, the reason for this is that 
liberalism tends to frame economic issues in overly benevolent terms.42 In liberal theory, 
economic issues usually appear in the form of win-win cooperation and as a pacifying force in 
interstate relations.43 This might give useful insights into cooperation between similar states – 
such as in European cooperation – but it is less helpful in explaining more iniquitous forms of 
economic relations, such as colonialism. Liberalism is therefore not very useful in 
understanding the persistence of core-periphery structures in the world economy and how 
they generate different interests between the North and the global South.  
 In order to address the weaknesses of the mainstream IR theories in explaining the 
postcolonial world, a collection of more radical theories emerged, often inspired by various 
strands of Marxist thought. These theories are generally grouped together under the name of 
‘structuralism’ in International Relations theory. 44  The most influential structuralist 
framework – especially in the developing world itself – is arguably dependency theory and its 
subsequent elaboration in world-systems analysis. As discussed in the previous section, 
dependency theory originated in the analysis of Latin American economies and their inability 
to successfully develop along the lines of countries in North America and Western Europe.45 
Writers such as Raul Prebisch and Fernando Henrique Cardoso argued that the structure of 
the world economy was essentially rigged in favour of the countries that were already rich at 
the expense of the less developed countries. 46  Dependency theorists argued that 
underdevelopment in the global South was a direct result of their unequal relationship with 
the North, which, again, was the foundation of development in the North.47  
 In an important sense, dependency theory emerged as a direct attack on liberal 
modernisation theory, which claimed that all societies developed along the same trajectory 
towards economic development and modernity, provided that they adopted the right 
policies.48 Dependency theory came to prominence as many in the global South were 
                                                
41 Alden, Morphet and Vieira, The South in World Politics, pp. 10-11. 
42 Arie M. Kacowicz, “Globalization, Poverty, and the Norh-South Divide” in North and South in the World 
Political Economy, eds. Reuveny and Thompson, (Oxford 2008), p. 27 
43 Tim Dunne, “Liberalism” in The Globalization of World Politics, 6th edition, eds. Baylis, Smith and Owens, 
(Oxford 2014), pp. 116-120. 
44 Jill Steans et al., An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes, 3rd edition, 
(Harlow 2010), pp. 75-102. 
45 Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. 
46 Steans et al., An Introduction to International Relations Theory, p. 83.  
47 Andre Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789, (New York 1978). 
48 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge 1960). 
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becoming increasingly disillusioned with the false promises of modernisation theory.49 
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that modernisation theory had falsely taken the nation state as 
its unit of analysis and therefore failed to understand how the structure of the world economy 
conditions the economic development of its constituent units.50 Instead of viewing the global 
South as being simply a few steps behind the North in terms of development – as did 
modernisation theory – dependency theorists and world-systems analysts insisted that the 
economic fortunes of North and South were closely intertwined and could not be understood 
in isolation from each other.51 The proper unit of analysis was what they called the ‘world-
system’, which had a distinct economic structure, including a division of labour.52 This 
division of labour was usually seen to have emerged during the colonial times but remained in 
place due to the structural constraints of the world economy.  
 This approach inevitably had major implications for the understanding of international 
relations. Issues of economic development, which had largely been left on the sidelines in 
most mainstream IR scholarship, were put squarely at the centre of analysis in the frameworks 
presented by structuralists.53 Instead of viewing international relations simply in terms of the 
bipolar division of the Cold War, structuralists introduced a horizontal cleavage into the 
analysis of world politics; a cleavage that divided the world into North and South according to 
their structural position in the world economy. The class divisions of Marxist theory were 
essentially re-applied on a global scale, dividing the world into a dominant core and an 
exploited periphery.  
 There is substantial variation between structuralist theories of international relations. 
However, most of them are centred on the idea that the economic features of the core-
periphery structure persisted after the formal end of colonialism and trapped the states of the 
global South in a subordinate position in the world economy. It is this observation that forms 
the basis of the theoretical framework of this research. This does not mean that the countries 
of the South always have the same interests in all matters concerning the world economy, nor 
that there is always a congruence of interests within the North. It does, however, mean that 
                                                
49 Steans et al., An Introduction to International Relations Theory, p. 83. 
50 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, pp. 10-22. 
51 Andrew Linklater, “Marx and Marxism” in Theories of International Relations, 4th edition, eds. Burchill et al. 
(Hampshire 2009), pp. 123-124. 
52 Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, pp. 16-18. 
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the legacy of colonialism left a deep cleavage of interest in the world economy between the 
North and the South.  
 In order to further substantiate this theoretical framework, the following section reviews 
the literature on North-South economic relations in the post-independence era and how it 
reflects the arguments put forth by structuralist theories. Furthermore, it shows how a 
structuralist framework actively informed the worldview of many governments in the global 
South and informed their economic and foreign policies.  
 
2.4.  Structuralism in Action – The Rise of Third World Politics  
In 1955, the leaders of twenty-nine Asian and African countries gathered in Bandung in 
Indonesia for the Afro-Asian Conference to discuss the process of decolonisation and the 
structure of the postwar international order. 54  High on the agenda was the economic 
predicament of countries in the global South. The delegates were keenly aware of the 
constraints that the colonial legacy placed on their economies and sought ways to address 
them.55 The final communiqué of the conference includes a lengthy chapter on economic and 
trade issues, which argues for the necessity of diversifying the South’s export destinations and 
fostering the establishment of South-South trade.56 
 The Bandung Conference laid the foundations of subsequent organisations and 
groupings, in which countries of the global South worked together on matters concerning the 
world economy.57 Most important in this respect was the establishment of the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the G77 group of developing countries in the United Nations.58 In the 1970s 
the G77 called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would better serve the 
needs and interests of the global South.59 These demands were heavily influenced by the 
dependency scholar Raúl Prebisch, who was the secretary general of UNCTAD from 1964 to 
                                                
54 Christopher J. Lee, “Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung” in Making a 
World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives, ed. Lee, (Ohio 2010), pp. 10-12. " 
55 Prashad, The Darker Nations, pp. 33-34. 
56 Asian-African Conference, Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, (April 
24, 1955), Available at [http://www.bandungspirit.org/IMG/pdf/anri-bandung_conference-final_ 
communique.pdf], (accessed May 20, 2015). 
57 Helen E. S. Nesadurai, “Bandung and the Political Economy of North-South Relations: Sowing the Seeds for 
Re-visioning International Society” in Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for 
International Order, eds. Tan and Acharya, "(Singapore 2008), pp. 77-83. 
58 Adekeye Adebajo, “From Bandung to Durban: Whither the Afro-Asian Coalition?” in Bandung Revisited: The 
Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, eds. Tan and Acharya, "(Singapore 2008), 
pp. 105-113. 
59 Mark T. Berger, “After the Third World? History, destiny and the fate of Third Worldism” Third World 
Quarterly 1 (2004): pp. 23-24. 
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1969.60 According to Prebisch, the economic difficulties of the global South were directly 
linked to its  
structural dependency on a capitalist core that controlled all levers of international decision-
making and profitable economic activity, thereby appropriating much of the gains from 
international economic activity.61 
An important part of this dependency was the structure of international trade discussed in the 
previous sections. The states in the South continued to trade almost exclusively with the 
North while having very limited trade with each other. This problem was widely understood, 
but difficult to overcome in practice.  
 As it turned out, the global South was largely unsuccessful in challenging the structures 
of power in the world economy during the Cold War years. Demands for a NIEO were flatly 
rejected by the North and the South had no leverage to back them up. The ‘Third World 
Project’ failed because it was based solely on political and ideological foundations. The 
South’s demands for a more equitable world order turned out to be just that: demands. And 
the South had little to back them up except for appeals to fairness.  
 However, the legacy of the Third World Project is important in many respects. It 
created a political platform for the South to collectively articulate and pursue their interests in 
the world economy.62 It showed that structuralist theories of international relations, with their 
focus on the core-periphery cleavage, are not merely an academic exercise. They reflect the 
material circumstances of countries in the global South as they are understood and acted upon 
by their governments. In spite of the East-West cleavages of the Cold War, there was 
widespread agreement in the global South that it had common interests vis-à-vis the North in 
the global economy.63 However, the simple North-South dichotomy of the Cold War era has 
become increasingly complicated in recent years – not least because of the growing influence 
of China in the global South.  
 
2.5.  China and the Global South – Natural Ally or New Exploiter?  
The literature on China’s engagement with the rest of the global South tends to fall roughly 
into two categories. Firstly, there is the literature that sees China as a new ‘core’ in the global 
                                                
60 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) was established at the insistence of 
countries in the global South in the 1960s and served as a kind of think-tank for South-South cooperation. See 
Toye, “Assessing the G77” Third World Quarterly, pp. 1761-1766. 
61 Nesadurai, “Bandung and the Political Economy of North-South Relations”, "p. 81. 
62 Ibid., "p. 93. 
63 Alden, Morphet and Vieira, The South in World Politics, pp. 53-55. 
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South, assuming many of the same roles as the Western powers before it. Secondly, there is a 
more sympathetic account of China’s involvement, which sees in it an emancipatory potential 
for the global South more generally. Interestingly, both of these views are to a large extent 
informed by a structuralist framework of analysis.  
 The former literature often argues that China’s hunger for natural resources is the main 
driver behind its trade relations with the South.64 Ian Taylor, for example, points out that 
China’s imports from Africa largely consist of primary products and raw materials. In his 
opinion, China’s role in the continent “[reifies] Africa’s dependent status within the global 
political economy.”65 Writing about the BRICS countries more generally, Taylor claims that 
their “trade structures with Africa do not exhibit any exceptionalism and are comparable to 
the relationships established by the capitalist core since the colonial period”.66 Similar 
accounts have been offered of China’s influence in Latin America.67 Barbara Kotschwar 
admits that trade with China “helps to enhance geographical diversification” of the 
continent’s trade, but it also “closely hues to Latin America’s traditional trade patterns”.68 
Indeed, it has been argued that China’s influence has led to “deindustrialisation in the region” 
and “propelled Latin America into a series of resource curse outcomes.”69 According to these 
accounts, China is essentially assuming the same structural position in the world economy as 
the old states in the core. Instead of offering alternatives to the core-periphery structure left 
behind by colonialism, China is simply joining the ranks of the core. Of course no one is 
claiming that China is actually colonising parts of the global South.70 But in an economic 
sense, the relationship exhibits the same structural features.  
 The other, more positive, account of China’s influence in the global South, sees it as the 
harbinger of a new era in South-South cooperation.71 According to this view, China offers the 
developing world an important alternative to the traditional powers of the North, both in terms 
of economic and political relations. Even if China largely imports primary products from the 
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global South, at least it offers an alternative market to the North and keeps up their prices for 
the benefit of the South. Indeed, some would argue that the impressive growth figures of 
Africa in the last decade would not have been possible if it were not for the boom in 
commodity prices driven by Chinese demand.72 Furthermore, authors of this inclination argue 
that China is still a developing country, and its interests in the world economy are therefore 
more closely attuned to those of other countries in the global South. This view is supported by 
developments in negotiation at the World Trade Organization, where developing countries, 
with China and India at the forefront, have been largely successful in forming a united front 
against the North on issues of international trade.73  
 This is also the image that the Chinese government wants to present of itself in its 
relationship with the global South.74 China is keen to emphasise that its involvement in the 
developing world is about win-win cooperation between equals, and seeks to downplay any 
perceived power asymmetries in these relationships.75 Indeed, Lowell Dittmer argues that 
China’s ‘developing country identity’ has if anything intensified in recent years, as the 
ideological identities of the Cold War period have withered away.76 Finally, as discussed in 
the following section, China has chosen to situate itself in the G77 group of developing 
countries at the United Nations. This group self-identifies as constituting the global South and 
representing its interests in matters of global economic governance. 
 This question of China’s role in the global South is complex and can be addressed from 
many angles. This research hopes to contribute to it by casting light on one of its aspects: 
China’s influence on the structure of international trade. If the former literature is correct and 
China is assuming the structural role of the core, then this should be reflected in international 
trade patterns. If China is reinforcing the dependent status of the South in the world economy, 
it should be expected that trade patterns in the South should continue to reflect a core-
periphery structure when China is excluded from the South category. Conversely, if there is a 
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more genuine growth of South-South trade taking place, it should be expected that trade 
patterns move away from the core-periphery structure even as China is excluded from the 
South group. According to this hypothesis, China would merely be first among equals in a 
new international trade structure, in which the South is starting to break its dependence on the 
North. The methodological task of assessing these alternative hypothesis will be explained in 
more detail in the following chapter. 
 However, of course there is some middle ground between these two poles of analysis.77 
Many would argue, for example, that China belongs neither squarely in the South nor in the 
North, and that its interests lie somewhere in between. Indeed, the same could be said about a 
number of other ‘emerging economies’. China’s influence would then be a mixture of 
transformation and reinforcement of the international trade structure. The two aforementioned 
hypotheses should therefore not be seen as binary choices. Instead they occupy the opposite 
ends of a continuum, along which it is possible to analyse China’s influence on the core-
periphery trade structure.  
 
2.6.  Definitions of Core and Periphery 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the exact definitions of core and periphery, as 
they will be employed in the thesis. As was explained in section 2.1, core and periphery 
signify positions of supremacy and subordination in the world economy, which emerged 
during colonial times and persisted into the contemporary era. During the Cold War, the 
peripheral countries were commonly referred to as the ‘Third World’. More recently, 
however, the term ‘global South’ has become the main descriptor of the developing world, as 
opposed to the ‘North’, which signifies the states in the core. Throughout this thesis, the terms 
‘core’ and ‘periphery’ will be used interchangeably with ‘global North’ and ‘global South’.78 
 However, there is no self-evident way to decide precisely which countries do and do not 
belong in each of these categories. In this thesis the following categorisation is used: the 
North is defined as those 36 states that are classified as ‘advanced economies’ in the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook classification system.79 This category includes all of the former 
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colonial powers along with other states that have similar economic characteristics at the top of 
the world’s economic hierarchy. The global South, on the other hand, is defined by current 
membership in the G77 group of developing countries at the United Nations. As noted in the 
previous section, the G77 is the institutional embodiment of the global South in matters 
concerning the world economy. It currently includes 134 countries.80 As it states in its official 
aims: 
The Group of 77 . . . provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote 
their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major 
international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South 
cooperation for development.81 
The main advantage of using this classification is that members of the G77 define themselves 
as belonging to the global South and having common economic interests by virtue of that. 
 
 
Figure 2: Members states of the G77.82 
 
Taken together, these two categories make up the bulk of the world’s countries.83 However, 
there are some countries that belong to neither category, most notably Russia, Mexico and 
                                                
80 The full list of current members can be found at the official website of the G77: 
[http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html], (accessed, March 9, 2015).  
81 Group of 77, About the Group of 77, Available at [http://www.g77.org/doc/], (accessed May 6, 2015).  
82 Map created by Kyat02. Available at [https://en.wiki2.org/wiki/File:G_77.svg], (accessed May 7, 2015). 
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Turkey, as well as those European states that do not make it into the ‘advanced economies’ 
category.84 
 
2.7.  Formulating the Hypotheses 
Based on the theory and literature reviewed in this chapter, the research questions that were 
posed in the introduction have been formulated into three interrelated hypotheses. They can 
be spelled out as follows:  
Hypothesis 1:  World trade was still characterised by a core-periphery structure 
during the early part of the research period 
By this it is meant that the core-periphery trade structure laid out in section 2.2 is still visible 
in the patterns of international trade during the early part of the research period. States in the 
core are dominant in the trade structure and there is limited South-South trade. 
Hypothesis 2:  The core-periphery trade structure underwent fundamental 
changes during the period from 1980 to 2013 
The core-periphery structure gradually gives way to a new trade structure as the balance of 
the world economy starts to shift.  
Hypothesis 3:  The rise of China in the world economy played a key role in the 
transformation of the international trade structure 
Provided that hypothesis one and two are correct, hypothesis three postulates that the rise of 
China was of prime importance in bringing about the transformation of the international trade 
structure.  
 
2.8.  Ontology and Epistemology 
Before proceeding to the empirical chapter, it is in order to clarify the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions on which the research is based. As discussed in section 2.3, this 
research is largely informed by structuralist theories of international relations. As with other 
traditional strands of Marxists thought, these theories tend to reflect a ‘foundationalist’ 
ontology and a ‘realist’85 epistemology.86 So does this research.87 By foundationalism it is 
                                                
84 With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the only G77 member in Europe. 
85 The term ‘realism’ as an epistemological position is not to be confused with the theory of ‘Realism’ in the 
International Relations discipline. 
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meant that the researcher posits that there is a ‘real world’ out there that exists independently 
of our knowledge of it.88 In other words, there is such a thing as ‘objective reality’ and the 
purpose of social science is to generate knowledge about that reality. 
 However, unlike positivists, this researcher does not claim that there is an 
unproblematic relationship between the ‘real world’ and our attempts to understand it.89 The 
social world cannot be reduced to observable and quantifiable phenomena; it is also made up 
of ‘invisible structures’ – such as class and patriarchy – that must be taken into account in 
order to understand the social world.90 In this research, these invisible structures appear, for 
example, in the form of a ‘core-periphery trade structure’. Although the existence and form of 
this structure is assessed through the evaluation of empirical data (international trade 
statistics), the structure as such is not directly visible. The individual data points come 
together to form a ‘structure’, only when viewed through the lens of a theoretical framework 
that presupposes its existence in the first place. And presumably they could be rearranged into 
a million other formations when viewed through different theories. Nevertheless, this core-
periphery structure is considered ‘real’ and is given causal powers in the analysis of the 
international system. The same could be said about the concepts of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ or 
‘North’ and ‘South’, which are used throughout the thesis. These are theoretical abstractions 
that are used to describe an intricate material reality. Nevertheless, the assumption of their 
existence provides the best possible explanation for the realities that are observed.91 
 Furthermore, epistemological realists recognise the importance of ideational structures 
in constituting social reality. The realist remains faithful to the idea that there is an objective 
reality that has causal powers in society, while at the same time acknowledging that these 
causal powers are always mediated through social constructions.92 This is why section 2.4 on 
Third World politics is relevant to this thesis. It demonstrates that the material reality of the 
core-periphery cleavage in the world economy coexisted with a corresponding ideational 
structure that informed the actions of key actors. The important point to note here is that 
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neither material reality nor ideational structures are seen as being in total control. They stand 
in a dialectical relationship where each constrains and influences the other.  
 This research uses empirical data to analyse the development of the core-periphery 
structure. However, the story being told is about more than the empirical reality of that 
structure. It is also about the social construction of that reality and how key actors have 
reflected on their circumstances and set out to change them. 
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3.  Empirical Work and Methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the gravity model of international trade and how it will be used to 
assess changes in the structure of international trade over the last few decades. The chapter 
starts by explaining the principles of the gravity model and goes on to explain how it is used 
in this particular research. Next, the process of collecting the data and compiling it into a 
gravity model database is explained. Finally, the chapter explains how the data was processed, 
how the gravity model was estimated and how the results were obtained. 
 
3.1.  The Gravity Model 
The gravity model of international trade was first introduced in 1962 by the Dutch economist 
Jan Tinbergen. 93  It has since been widely used in research on international political 
economy.94 In its most basic form, the gravity model uses two different variables to predict 
the quantity of trade between two countries. These variables are the economic weight of the 
countries involved (as measured by their GDP) and the distance between them (usually 
measured as the geographical distance between their capitals). A basic gravity model takes the 
following form:95 
 !"#$%!!"#$% = !!× !GDP!importer!×!GDP!exporter!"#$%&'(  
 
The logic behind the gravity model is that countries are likely to trade more with each other if 
their economies are larger. For the importing country, the size of its GDP will provide be a 
reasonable estimate for the size of its market, and the larger that market is, the more this 
country is likely to import. Similarly for the exporting country, the size of its GDP serves as 
an estimate of the economic activity of the country, including the range and volume of 
products it produces. The larger the economy, the more it is likely to export in absolute terms. 
Distance on the other hand serves as a proxy for transportation costs as well as a number of 
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other impediments to trade. The greater the distance between two countries, the less they are 
likely to trade with each other according to the model.96 In other words, distance between 
countries is inversely related to the value of trade between them, hence why the GDP values 
are divided by distance. 
 However, the relationship between the variables does not take a completely linear 
form. The gravity model is therefore usually estimated in a log-linear form, using the natural 
logarithm of each variable:97 
 Ln !"#$%!!"#$% = ! + !1!Ln !"#!"#$%&'% + !2!Ln !"#!"#$%&!% + !3!Ln[!"#!"#$%] 
 
Of course there are an infinite amount of additional variables that can influence the amount of 
trade between any two countries. However, these two variables tend to explain quite a good 
deal of the variation in trade volumes between different pairs of countries. Indeed, the very 
purpose of the gravity model is not to fully explain the amount of trade between countries, but 
to serve as a reasonable baseline, which can be used to assess the influence of other variables.  
 For example, the most common way of using the gravity model in research on 
international political economy is to start by compiling a dataset that includes trade volumes 
between each country pair, the size of their economies and the distances between them. These 
variables (in their log-linear form) are then used to estimate a gravity model. The model will 
assign a certain weight to each variable to establish the best possible fit. A simple gravity 
model like this will usually provide an R2 explanatory power of around 50-70%.98 
 The next step is then to add an additional variable into the model and see if it adds any 
statistically significant explanatory power to the model. For example, if one is interested in 
assessing the influence of defence alliances on volumes of international trade, the next step 
would be to include a dummy variable in the model that indicates whether any two countries 
are together in a defence alliance or not. The model would then be estimated again in order to 
see if the military alliance variable added any value the predictive powers of the model and 
whether the variable of interest was statistically significant. Indeed, this is more or less what 
                                                
96 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
97 Mansfield, “Quantitative Approaches to the International Political Economy”, p. 172. 
98 The R2 value measures how much of the variation in the dependent variable (in this case volume of trade) can 
be explained by the independent variables included in the model.  
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Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield did in their study of the affects of alliances on 
international trade.99 
 The purpose of this explanation is to show how a gravity model can serve as a useful 
baseline when it comes to assessing the influence of other features in the global economy that 
are of interest. Without such a baseline, it would be very difficult to make plausible claims 
about the influence of certain variables such as defence alliances. Just by knowing which 
countries are together in an alliance and how much they trade with each other, does not really 
provide a solid basis for assessing whether – and how much – the alliance matters when it 
comes to explaining trade values. However, by using a gravity model with data from multiple 
different country pairs, it is possible to control for standard explanatory variables such as size 
and distance, while zooming in on the particular feature of interest. In other words, the gravity 
model allows for a reasonable estimation of whether something matters, other things being 
equal.  
 
3.2.  The Gravity Model and International Trade Patterns 
In this thesis, the gravity model will be used to assess patterns of international trade and how 
they have changed over time. As in the example explained in the previous section, a standard 
gravity model using GDP sizes and distance will be estimated and used as a baseline for the 
inquiry.  
 As was explained in the theoretical chapter, the traditional patterns of trade in a core-
periphery structure are disproportionately concentrated on the economies in the core. 
Economies in the core tend to trade extensively with each other as well as with economies on 
the periphery. However, trade between countries on the periphery is limited. To some extent 
this is to be expected, given that states in the core are wealthy and have large GDPs, while 
states on the periphery have smaller economies and are also more dispersed around the planet 
geographically. However, by using the gravity model it is possible to assess whether 
international trade is concentrated in the core in excess of what can be explained by the 
standard factors of GDP size and geographical distance. Similarly, it also assesses whether 
trade between countries on the periphery is less than would be expected from a standard 
gravity model. 
                                                
99 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade” American Poltical Science 
Review 2 (1993). 
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 In order to make plausible claims about the existence of a certain ‘trade structure’, as 
this thesis does, it is necessary to show that international trade patterns differ systematically 
from the predictions of a simple gravity model. The gravity model, thus, provides a baseline, 
against which actual trade values will be compared. The residuals can then be aggregated in 
order to detect systematic variations. By doing this, the research establishes a more solid 
foundation for claiming that there is such a thing as a core-periphery trade pattern in the first 
place. And more importantly, it enables the analysis of whether – and how – this pattern is 
changing over time.  
 
3.3.  Collecting the Data and Constructing the Database 
When it comes to doing research with a gravity model, the first thing that is needed is a 
database with all the necessary data. There are several ready-made gravity model databases 
accessible online. However, all of these databases turned out to be too limited in their 
geographical and/or temporal coverage for the purposes of this research. It was therefore 
decided to compile a gravity model database from scratch. 
  
Trade Statistics 
The first step was to find data on international trade statistics between countries. This data is 
available in the Direction of International Trade Statistics (DOTS) database from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).100 This database was obtained from the IMF’s eLibrary 
and used as the base for the gravity model database. The database includes one-directional 
trade flows between each country pair for each year. By one-directional trade flows it is 
meant that exports from Germany to Sweden, e.g., represent one case and exports from 
Sweden to Germany represent another. Modern gravity models are always estimated in this 
way rather than looking at the trade relationship as a whole.101 The DOTS database provides 
several different indicators on both imports and exports. However, import figures are 
generally considered more reliable for the purposes of constructing a gravity model.102 The 
indicator that was chosen for this project was therefore the value of imports, free on board 
(FOB), in current US dollars.103 FOB values are preferred to CIF (cost of insurance and 
                                                
100 International Monetary Fund, Direction of International Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. Available at: 
[http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85], (accessed February 13, 2015).  
101 Ben Shepard, The Gravity Model of International Trade: A User Guide, (Bangkok 2013), p. 15. 
102 World Trade Organization and UNCTAD, A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis, (N.p. 2012), p. 119. 
Available at: [http://vi.unctad.org/tpa], (accessed February 13, 2015). 
103 Current values are always used in gravity model research. See ibid., p. 119. 
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freight) values, because the latter include costs that are correlated with distance. This may 
lead to simultaneous equation biases, as the same effect is being captures by more than one 
variable in the model.104 The database was downloaded in CVS format and then converted to 
SAV format for processing in the SPSS statistical software application. 
 The database includes data from 1947 to 2013 with a total of 1.418.251 cases. However, 
data on developing countries is rather sparse in the early decades of the database. It was 
therefore decided to limit the inquiry to the period from 1980 onwards. This left the database 
with 939.957 cases. Next, all cases with missing values or recorded values of zero were 
eliminated.105 This left the database with 599.260 cases. 
 
Gross Domestic Product Figures 
The next step was to find GDP figures for each country for each year and add them to the 
database. These figures were obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database.106 
The chosen indicator was gross domestic product, current prices in US dollars.107 The 
database was downloaded in excel format from the IMF’s website and then converted into 
SAV format for SPSS processing. 
 Next, the GDP database was merged into the trade statistics database. This had to be 
done in several steps as the databases are built in different ways and the trade statistics 
database has a lot more cases. Furthermore, for each case in the trade statistics database, two 
different GDP variables needed to be added to the case: one for the exporting country and one 
for the importing country. After completing this, each case in the database now included the 
value of one-directional trade between each country pair for each year, as well the GDP 
figures for both countries in that year. 
 However, GDP figures for some countries were missing for some years. This is usually 
due to civil war or for polities that are not fully independent, like some small Caribbean and 
Pacific island states. Such cases cannot be included in the gravity model and are therefore 
eliminated. This left the database with 502.364 cases. 
                                                
104 Luca De Benedictis and Daria Taglioni, “The Gravity Model of International Trade” in The Trade Impact of 
European Union Preferential Policies: An Analysis Through Gracity Models, eds. De Benedictis and Salvatici, 
(Heidelberg 2011), p. 73. 
105 This is common practice in gravity model research, especially when many of the zero values reflect missing 
values. For a discussion see: WTO and UNCTAD, A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis, p. 112-113. 
106 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, (October 2014 edition), Available at: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx], (accessed February 13, 2015). 
107 Again, this indicator was chosen to comply with standard practice in gravity modelling. For a discussion see: 
Shepard, The Gravity Model of International Trade, p. 15. 
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Figures for Distance 
The final variable that needed to be added to the database was that of distance between 
countries. This data was obtained from the CEPII GeoDist Database by Mayer and 
Zignago.108 The GeoDist Database includes two different files: one with country specific 
information and the other with dyadic information such as distances between countries.109 The 
dyadic database was downloaded in DTA format and converted to SAV format for SPSS 
processing. The chosen indicator was the ‘distcap’ variable, which measures the geographical 
distance between the capital cities of each country pair.  
 This file was then merged into the original database. Because the information is dyadic, 
each case had to be merged according to two different variables: the two countries concerned. 
As before, there were missing values for some cases, which subsequently had to be 
eliminated. However, these were surprisingly few. After merging the files, the database was 
left with 498.474 valid cases.  
 
Database Summary 
• Annual one-directional trade flows between all countries, values in current US dollars 
• Gross domestic produce in current US dollars for each country for each year 
• Distance between the capital cities of each country pair in kilometres 
• Temporal coverage: 1980-2013 
• Number of cases: 498.474 
 
3.4.  Data Processing 
As was discussed in section 3.1, gravity models are usually estimated using the natural 
logarithms of all the variables. The next step was thus to recompute all variables into their 
natural logarithm. Furthermore, all cases were coded with dummy variables to indicate 
whether the exporting and importing countries belonged to the ‘North’ or ‘South’ categories, 
as they were defined in section 2.6. These dummy variables were then used to construct more 
specific dummy variables, which indicated the type of trade relationship for each case (e.g. 
North-North, South-South, North to South etc.).  
                                                
108 Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago, GeoDist Database, CEPII, (2011), Available at: 
[http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6], (accessed February 13, 2015).  
109 See also: Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago, Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: The GeoDist database, 
CEPII Working Paper (2011-25).  
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3.5.  Adding Additional Variables to the Model?  
In gravity model research, it is common to add additional variables to the model in order to 
specify it further. Some older studies used demographic variables such as population or GDP 
per capita, in addition to absolute GDP. However, this practice has been generally discredited 
in the gravity literature and has therefore fallen out of use.110 A more common practice is to 
include various dummy variables to account for factors such as common language for the 
country pair, a previous colonial relationship or membership of economic bodies such as the 
European Union, the World Trade Organisation or NAFTA.  
 However, for the purposes of this research, it was decided to stick to the raw gravity 
model – only GDP size and distance – instead of specifying the model further. The reason is 
that the purpose of this research is to detect large patterns over time rather than zooming in on 
a particular explanatory variable. This aim is somewhat different from much of the other work 
in the gravity literature, which tends to be geared towards testing certain variables such as the 
impact of free trade agreements (FTAs) or military alliances. For example, if the purpose of 
the research is to test the effect of a military alliance in trade values, it makes sense to include 
other dummy variables – such as FTAs – in order to minimise the risk of spurious correlation. 
In other words, when the purpose it to test a specific variable, it can be useful to add other 
variables to the model to make sure that the observed relationship is not due to a third, 
unobserved variable.  
 However, when the purpose of the research is to analyse large patterns over time – such 
as changes in the core-periphery trade structure – these additional dummy variables are often 
simply a part of the story that needs to be told. Colonial legacies, for example, do indeed 
influence trade patterns today. And this is an important part of the dynamics that this research 
is about. It would therefore be a mistake to ‘explain away’ this kind of influence through a 
dummy variable and thereby make it invisible in subsequent analysis.  
 
3.6.  Single or Multiple Models?  
There are two possible ways to estimate a gravity model for a long time period. One 
possibility is to estimate a single model for the whole dataset, covering all years. The other 
possibility is to estimate a separate model for each year. 
                                                
110 Shepard, The Gravity Model of International Trade, p. 15. 
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 The advantage of using a single model for the whole period is that it makes 
comparisons between years more straightforward. It produces a single model that is meant to 
explain variations in trade value for the whole period. However, this method also has several 
methodological disadvantages. Firstly, it violates the assumption of regression analysis that 
each observation should be independent. Trade flows between the same pairs of countries in 
different years are clearly not independent in this way. Furthermore, estimating a single 
model for the whole period usually introduces autocorrelation into the model. This can be 
somewhat alleviated by introducing a time variable into the model. However, this is a 
problematic solution, as a great deal of the explanatory value of the model then becomes 
simply a factor of time. The value of trade in current US dollars has increased immensely 
from 1980 to 2013, and the time variable will therefore be highly correlated with trade value 
and explain a lot of the variation in the dataset. This is problematic if the purpose of the 
research is to track changes over time. Actual changes in the world’s trading structure might 
be ‘explained away’ by the time variable and thus become invisible in the analysis.  
 Finally, forcing a single model on the whole dataset inevitably produces a poorer fit of 
the model than if a separate model is estimated for each year. Using a single model assumes 
that the effect of the explanatory variables – such as distance – remains constant over time, 
whereas in reality the effect might change. Also, the value of world trade was around 1,5 
trillion dollars in 1980, whereas it was 18,4 trillion dollars in 2013.111 It would be problematic 
to expect a single model to provide a good fit for such dramatic variations over time. 
 It was therefore decided to estimate a separate model for each year. This method 
alleviates most of the problems that are associated with the single model. Firstly, it is much 
more plausible to claim that each observation is independent. Secondly, autocorrelation and 
other problems related to the time factor are eliminated. Furthermore, it produces a better fit 
for the model. It allows the explanatory variables of GDP size and distance to explain as 
much as possible for each year, instead of forcing a questionable average on the whole 
dataset. Finally, by using separate models for each year it is possible to code some of the 
research questions into dummy variables and test them directly by putting them into the 
regression. This method is explained in more detail in section 3.9. 
 
                                                
111 United Nations, 2013 International Trade Statistics Yearbook, volume II, (New York 2014), p. 3 
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3.7.  Estimating the Simple Gravity Models 
First, a simple gravity model was estimated for each year in the dataset using ordinary least 
square regression (OLS). As previously discussed, the model uses GDP size and geographical 
distance as independent variables, and one-directional trade value as the dependent variable. 
The models are estimated by using the natural logarithm of each variable. The model, thus, 
takes the following form: 
 Ln !"#$%!!"#$% = ! + !1!Ln !"#!"#$%&'% + !2!Ln !"#!"#$%&!% + !3!Ln[!"#$%&'(] 
 
The time period is 34 years (1980-2013) and therefore there were 34 models estimated. All 
three independent variables were significant for all of the 34 years and all pointed in the 
expected directions. The GDP size of both exporting and importing countries were positively 
related to the value of trade, whereas distance was inversely related to the value of trade. All 
three variables were statistically significant at the 99,9% level for all of the 34 models. 
Furthermore, the coefficients for each variable were remarkably stable over time, although 
there is a steady trend of a decreasing constant over time. Finally, all 34 models provided 
relatively similar amounts of explanatory value: the R2 statistic ranged between 0,57 at the 
lowest to 0,66 at the highest, with an average of 0,62 and a standard deviation of 0,02. The 
full overview of each model can be found in appendix 1. 
 
3.8.  Analysing Standardised Trade Residuals (Indicator 1) 
As already mentioned, the R2 statistic for the models was around generally around 0,62, 
which means that the models explain around 62% of the variation in trade value between 
countries. However, it is the remaining 38% variation that is really of interest. If the 
hypothesis is correct, and there is an identifiable core-periphery trade structure in the world, 
then this structure should be detectable in the remaining variation in the data. In other words, 
the 38% variation that is left unexplained by the gravity models should not be completely 
randomised but should show a systematic pattern.  
 In order to look for these patterns, the residuals and the standardised residuals for each 
case in the dataset were saved after estimating the gravity models.112 These residuals can 
                                                
112 A residual is the actual value of trade for each case minus the expected value of trade according to the model. 
Therefore, if the trade is more than expected the residual is positive, but if trade is less than expected the residual 
is negative. The standardised residuals are simply the residuals divided by their standard deviation. This makes 
them easier to interpret and compare between years. 
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subsequently be aggregated and compared between countries and groups of countries. For 
example, the standardised residuals for all cases that represent South-South trade can be 
calculated into an average for each year. By doing this, it is possible to see whether South-
South trade is generally more or less than would be expected from the traditional factors of 
the gravity model, and how this develops over time. Similar aggregations are carried out for 
other types of trade relationships. The analysis of standardised trade residuals is the first of 
three different types of indicators that the results are based on.113 
 
3.9.  Detecting Patterns with Dummy Variables (Indicator 2) 
An alternative method to identify patterns of an international trade structure is to code the 
expected pattern into dummy variables and add them into the regression. For example, all 
cases were coded with a dummy variable that identified whether it was a case of South-South 
trade or not. If both the exporter and importer were a country of the South, the variable took 
the value of '1', otherwise it took the value of '0'. This variable was then added to the 
regression analysis and the models estimated again. It is then possible to see whether the 
dummy variable adds any explanatory value to the model and whether its impact is 
statistically significant. Furthermore, it is possible to look at the coefficient (the slope) of the 
dummy variable for each year and see if it changes over time. The gravity model that is 
estimated with this method, thus, takes the following form: 
 Ln !" = ! + !1!Ln !"#!"#$%&'% + !2!Ln !"#!"#$%&!% + !3!Ln !"#$ + !4![dummy] 
 
Similar dummy variable coding was carried out for other trade relationships, such as North-
North trade, South-North trade and North-South trade. For each of these dummy variables, a 
separate regression analysis was carried out that included only the three traditional 
independent variables in addition to the dummy variable. The reason is that these dummy 
variables are to some extent mirrors of each other and will therefore be explaining the same 
things, albeit in opposite directions. It is therefore better to estimate separate models for each 
dummy variable, whilst being aware that the resulting coefficients are to some extent the 
                                                
113 This method of analysing residuals over time was partly inspired by an article by Barma et al., although they 
use a somewhat different methodology in many ways. Naazneen Barma et al., “A World Without the West? 
Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Implications” Chinese Journal of International Politics 4 (2009): pp. 531-
532. 
 33 
reflections of the same pattern. The full overview of these models can be found in appendices 
2 and 3. 
 
3.10.  Filling Out the Picture with Absolute Values and Percentages (Indicator 3) 
Finally, in order to draw up a fuller picture, the analysis of the previous two indicators is 
complimented by statistics that describe trade relationships in absolute values and 
percentages. These values are taken directly from the DOTS database and are not processed 
through a gravity model. As was previously explained, the gravity model is estimated by 
using the natural logarithm of each variable. This is what makes the gravity model possible. 
However, it can be difficult to analyse the logarithmic results and residuals in terms of actual 
values.114 Looking at the absolute values will therefore help to put the actual quantities into 
context in a way that is not directly evident from looking only at the gravity model residuals.  
 The first two indicators – the standardised residuals and the dummy variable 
coefficients – are therefore used to analyse the international trade structure through a 
generalised model. The third indicator, however, is used to reduce the abstraction of the first 
two variables and show what they mean in actual terms. Taken together, these three indicators 
are meant to draw up a comprehensive picture of how the international trade structure has 
developed over the last three and a half decades and thereby shed light on the research 
questions of this thesis. 
 
3.11.  Ethical Considerations 
This research was carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines of The Swedish 
Research Council.115 Doing so was fairly straightforward, as this research does not rely on the 
use of personal information or data collected directly from people through interviews or other 
types of fieldwork. All the empirical material that was collected for this research is 
quantitative data that is publicly available. The ethical considerations discussed in the 
guidelines of the SRC (transparency, consent, confidentiality, use of personal information 
etc.) did therefore not prove to be salient in this research. Nevertheless, the author is aware of 
and acknowledges the importance of ethical considerations in academic research.   
                                                
114 One possibility was be to ‘delog’ the expected values and calculate ‘actual residuals’ instead of residuals from 
the logged variable. However, this tended to provide very biased results and was therefore aborted.  
115 Vetenskapsrådet, Forskningsetiska principer inom humanistisk-samhällsvetenskaplig forskning, (N.p. n.d.) 
Available at [http://www.codex.vr.se/texts/HSFR.pdf], (accessed May 14, 2015). 
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4.  Empirical Findings 
 
This chapter introduces the empirical findings of the research. It starts by assessing the 
existence of a core-periphery trade structure during the early part of the research period, 
before turning to a more comprehensive analysis of how trade patterns have developed over 
time. Finally, the chapter looks specifically at the role of China in this development.  
 
4.1.  The Core-Periphery Trade Structure 
As was discussed in the theoretical chapter, the first hypothesis of this research was that there 
was an identifiable core-periphery structure to international trade. 
Hypothesis 1:  World trade was still characterised by a core-periphery structure 
during the early part of the research period 
Furthermore, a core-periphery trade structure had been defined as having the following 
features: 
A. States in the core occupy a central position in the trade structure, trading extensively 
amongst themselves as well as with states on the periphery 
B. States on the periphery trade with states in the core but have little trade amongst 
themselves 
One way to assess the existence of this structure is to estimate the models using dummy 
variables for different trade relationships. This procedure was explained in section 3.9. 
 First, all models were estimated with the inclusion of a dummy variable for South-South 
trade. In accordance with the hypothesis, the dummy for South-South trade was inversely 
related to trade value between countries in the early years of the research period. Furthermore, 
the variable was statistically significant at a 99,9% level for all years from 1980 until 1993. 
However, the coefficient for the South-South dummy variable gradually decreases over time 
and, in fact, becomes positive after 1995. Figure 3 shows the unstandardised coefficients for 
the South-South dummy variable for each year.  
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Figure 3: Unstandardized coefficients for South-South trade dummy variable for each model. 
 
Next, a similar method was used to assess the dominance of the North in international trade. 
Again, all models were estimated, but this time with a dummy variable for all cases that 
involved trade with the North.116  
 
 
Figure 4: Unstandardized coefficients for the North’s trade dummy variable for each model. 
 
                                                
116 This includes both trade that the North has amongst itself as well as trade it has with other regions.  
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In accordance with the hypothesis, this dummy variable was positively related to the value of 
trade. The variable was statistically significant at a 99,9% level for the whole period and 
remained positive throughout. However, the coefficient for the North trade dummy decreases 
substantially throughout the time period as figure 4 demonstrates. 
 These findings strongly supports the first hypothesis: during the early part of the period 
under study, there was a core-periphery trade structure in which a) states in the North 
occupied a central position in the trading structure and b) states in the South had limited trade 
amongst themselves. 
 
4.2.  The Development of the Trade Structure 
This section addresses the second hypothesis of the thesis, concerning the development of the 
trade structure over time.  
Hypothesis 2:  The core-periphery trade structure underwent fundamental 
changes during the period from 1980 to 2013 
In order to do assess this, the section introduces evidence from standardised trade residuals 
for different groups, as well as absolute values of trade and percentages. These methods were 
described in sections 3.8 and 3.10, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5: Standardised residuals for South-South trade as well as all trade involving the North 
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Figure 5 shows the standardised residuals for South-South trade as well as all trade involving 
the North. As expected, the data on this figure tells a very similar story as the evidence from 
the dummy coefficients. South-South trade was substantially below the expected value of a 
simple gravity model at the beginning of the period (-0,2 standard deviations), but rises 
steadily towards the expected value around the turn of the millennium. After that, South-
South trade is actually more than would be expected by a simple gravity model.  
 Similarly, trade involving countries in the North is substantially above the expected 
value at the beginning of the period (+0,18 standard deviations) but gradually decreases over 
time. However, it seems to level off at around +0,05 standard deviations in the early 1990s 
and stays that way until the years of the economic crisis of 2007-2008, after which it starts to 
increase again. However, it should be noted that this increase in the years after the crisis is 
probably due to falling or stagnating GDP figures in the North, which pushes down the 
expected values and therefore increases the residuals. The same – albeit inverse – dynamic is 
probably the explanation for the falling residuals for South-South trade during the same 
period.  
 
 
Figure 6: Standardised residuals for exports from the South. 
 
Figure 6 compares the residuals of exports from the South to different destinations. During 
the early part of the period, the South exported substantially more to the North than the 
gravity model can explain, and substantially less to the other destinations in the South. The 
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gap is 0,33 standard deviations. Again, however, the gap gradually narrows and after 2003 the 
South exports more to the South than the North as measured in terms of trade residuals. 
 It is worth pointing out that the economies of the South have generally grown faster 
than the economies of the North during this period.117 The expected values for trade within the 
South will therefore have grown faster than expected values for trade with the North. It is 
therefore all the more remarkable that South-South trade managed to grow at such a pace that 
it closes the gap with South to North trade in terms of residuals. In other words, the growth of 
South-South trade exceeds what can be explained by GDP growth in the South.  
 
 
Figure 7: Value of South-South trade in billions of current US dollars.  
 
Looking beyond the residuals from the gravity model, figure 7 shows what the growth of 
South-South trade looks like in absolute terms. As the figure shows, the total value of South-
South trade remained below 100 billion US dollars annually throughout the 1980s and below 
500 billion annually until 2004. In the subsequent decade, however, the value increased more 
than five-fold and is today more than two and a half trillions dollars. 
 If this development is expressed in percentages and compared to the South’s exports to 
the North, it is clear that the South is rapidly diversifying the destinations of its exports. As 
figure 8 shows, only around 20% of the South’s exports went to other countries in the South 
during the 1980s, increasing to 25% in the 1990s. Conversely, 80% went to the North during 
                                                
117 Peter Lloyd, “The Role of Developing Countries in Global Economic Governance” The Singapore Economic 
Review 2 (2012): pp. 2-3. 
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the 1980s dropping to 75% in the 1990s. However, it is only after the turn of the millennium 
that the convergence really starts to gain momentum. In 2013, countries in the South imported 
42% of each other’s goods while 55% went to the North. The gap is closing fast. This growth 
in percentages to the South is all the more remarkable if it is kept in mind that overall exports 
of countries in the South have more than quadrupled since the year 2000.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Destination of exports from the South in percentages. 
 
As this section has demonstrated, there have been major changes in the patterns of trade over 
the last three and a half decades. Figure 9 sums up these developments by showing the 
standardised residuals from all four major trade flows: South-South, North-North, South to 
North and North to South. It shows how states in the North were preeminent in trade during 
the early period, trading amongst themselves far in excess of what a gravity model would 
predict, while also having extensive trade relations with the South. The countries in the South, 
however, had relatively little trade amongst themselves. All the expected features of the core-
periphery structure are present during the early part of the period. However, the residuals 
gradually converge as the period progresses and countries in the South take on a more 
prominent and independent role in international trade. 
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Figure 9: Standardised trade residuals for South-South trade, North-North trade, South to North 
trade and North to South trade. 
 
Taken together, the evidence introduced in this section strongly supports the second 
hypothesis. The international trade structure has undergone substantial changes in the period 
under study. Today, there is no longer evidence of a systematic bias in favour of the North in 
international trade relations and South-South trade has ceased to underperform. In other 
words, the core-periphery structure of international trade has dissolved.  
 Of course this does not mean that the North has been relegated to a marginal position in 
world trade. In fact, the North continues to be at the forefront of international trade in both 
absolute and relative terms. However, the days when all roads led to the North are gone. The 
core-periphery structure that put the North at the centre of all trade relations has given way to 
a more balanced trade structure, in which most regions have diverse trade partners in both the 
developed and developing world. The geopolitical implications of this will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
 
4.3.  China, the Global South and World Trade 
As already mentioned, China has emerged as the largest trading nation, not only in the South, 
but in the world as a whole. This section examines the impact of China on patterns of 
international trade during the period under study in order to assess the third hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3:  The rise of China in the world economy played a key role in the 
transformation of the international trade structure 
Figure 10 shows the standardised residuals of China’s exports to the North and the South. As 
the figure shows, China’s overall exports have been far greater than a simple gravity model 
would predict during most of the period under study. Contrary to common perceptions, these 
figures do not indicate that China’s exports have been uniformly directed towards the North. 
Indeed, China’s exports to the South are substantially above gravity model prediction 
throughout the period, especially after 1990. What is particularly interesting in this figure, is 
that Chinese exports to the South surpass exports to the North in terms of residuals as early as 
2004 and are today far higher than those to the North with a gap of 0,3 standard deviations. 
 
 
Figure 10: Standardised residuals for China’s exports to the North and the South.  
 
It has been commonly noted that China’s exports to the North suffered after the 2008 
financial crisis and, indeed, the data strongly supports that. However, the perception that 
China somehow reoriented itself towards the South as a result of the crisis is misleading. 
China’s shift towards the South builds on older foundations and had to some extent already 
taken place before the crisis hit the economies of the core.  
 Figure 11 shows the origins of China’s imports in terms of residuals. Here there is a 
more pronounced difference between the North and the South, as China clearly imports a lot 
more from the North than the South during the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, China imports less 
from the South than a simple gravity model would predict until the year 2000. However, in 
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the new millennium there is an explosion in China’s imports from the South and today China 
imports substantially more from the South than the North in terms of residuals. It is 
noteworthy that China’s imports do not seem to have been particularly affected by the 
economic crisis compared to the exports. Indeed, China’s imports from the North actually 
increased slightly.118 
 
 
Figure 11: Standardised residuals for China’s imports from the North and the South. 
 
Next, in order to evaluate the quantitative impact of China on the growth of South-South 
trade, figure 12 shows the value of South-South trade as a percentage of world trade. As the 
blue line reflects, South-South trade accounted for a meagre 5% of world trade during the 
early part of the research period, further supporting the hypothesis of a core-periphery trade 
structure. Furthermore, as expected, the new millennium marks a turning point and South-
South trade starts to grow rapidly as a proportion of world trade, reaching around 15% in year 
2013. 
 However, if China is excluded from the South group, the growth in South-South trade is 
much more modest, reaching only around 8% of world trade in 2013. China’s impact on 
South-South trade was relatively little during the early part of the period, but became more 
pronounced after year 2000. China today accounts for up to half of South-South trade as 
either importer or exporter. This observation seems to support the hypothesis that China has 
been a major contributor to the growth of South-South trade during the period under study.  
                                                
118 Again, this might be the result of falling expected values in the models due to stalling GDP growth in the 
North in the aftermath of the crisis. 
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Figure 12: Value of South-South trade as a proportion of world trade, with and without China.  
 
However, it is noteworthy that a qualitative shift in South-South trade nevertheless takes 
place, even if China is excluded from the analysis. As the red line shows, South-South trade 
excluding China remained at only 4% of world trade until 2003. In the decade that followed, 
however, it more than doubled as a proportion of world trade. Although this growth is much 
less pronounced in quantitative terms when China is excluded, it nevertheless suggests that 
the developments in the new millennium are about more than just the rise of China. 
 
 
Figure 13: Standardised residuals for South-South trade with and without China. 
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In order to assess this further, figure 13 shows the standardised residuals for South-South 
trade when China is excluded from the group of countries in the South in comparison with the 
residuals when China is included. As the figure shows, the exclusion of China does not 
substantially alter the pattern of South-South trade over the period. The relative lack of South-
South trade during the early part of the period is unchanged and so is the steady upward trend. 
Excluding China leads to a slightly lower residual for South-South trade during the last 
decade, but the change is not dramatic.  
 Looking at the overall development of trade patterns over the period delivers similar 
results. Figure 14 shows all the same residuals as figure 9, except that China is excluded from 
the group of countries in the South. The overall patterns remain the same. The period starts 
off with a clear core-periphery structure that gradually gives way to a more equal trade 
structure. Although the rise of South-South trade is less pronounced when China is excluded, 
the dissolution of the core-periphery structure nevertheless takes place.  
 
 
Figure 14: Standardised trade residuals for South-South trade, North-North trade, South to North 
trade and North to South trade, when China is excluded from the South group.  
 
The fate of hypothesis 3 is therefore rather mixed. In terms of absolute values, the influence 
of China on international trade patterns has been immense. China accounts for up to half of all 
South-South trade. However, when looking at the overall development of the trade structure 
in terms of residuals, the impact of China is much less pronounced, albeit still visible. The 
claim that the transformation of the core-periphery trade structure can be explained entirely 
by the influence of China is therefore not confirmed by the evidence. Instead, the evidence 
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suggests that there has been a more general reorientation of trade in the global South, not only 
towards China, but also towards other destinations in the South.  
 However, it is important to note that this methodology of excluding China’s residuals 
has it its limits. China’s residuals can be excluded from the South’s aggregation, but the 
country’s overall influence on the world economy cannot be imagined away. China’s rise to 
become the largest trading nation in the world has had an immense influence on world 
markets, arguably enhancing the South’s terms of trade. This influence is ‘system-wide’ and, 
thus, goes well beyond what is captured by China’s own trade residuals. It is therefore 
impossible to assert that the dissolution of the core-periphery trade structure would have taken 
place in the absence of China’s rise. Ultimately, the assessment of hypothesis 3 remains 
inconclusive.  
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5.  Discussion 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical implications of the results and how they contribute to 
the literature.  
 
5.1.  Postcolonial Structures of International Trade 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the first hypothesis is strongly supported by the 
evidence presented. The core-periphery structure of international trade is clearly visible in the 
early part of the research period – during the 1980s and part of the 1990s – reflecting the 
preeminent position of the advanced economies in international trade, and the overall lack of 
South-South trade. In terms of absolute values, the lack of South-South trade is not surprising 
and confirms what is widely believed in the literature. As discussed in the chapter 2.3, the 
economies of the global South are relatively small and widely dispersed around the globe 
geographically – both factors that are known to inversely affect quantities of trade. It might 
therefore be tempting to explain the core-periphery trade structure as simply the result of 
these variables.  
 However, the contribution of this thesis is to show that the core-periphery trade 
structure was clearly visible, even when the variables of economic size and geographical 
distance were factored out. In other words, by using the gravity model, this thesis 
demonstrates the existence of clear patterns of international trade that go beyond what can be 
explained by the ‘usual suspects’ of GDP and distance. This suggests that Galtung’s feudal 
interaction structure was, indeed, an important characteristic of the colonial world economy 
and that its influence persisted in international trade patterns throughout most of the 20th 
century.  
 
5.2.  Metamorphosis of World Trade 
The results also show that the international trade structure has undergone fundamental 
changes during the period under study as postulated by the second hypothesis. The North 
gradually loses its preeminent position in the trade structure and there is an explosion in the 
value of South-South trade. It grows from around 100 billion in the 1980s to a staggering 
2.700 billion in 2013. In absolute values, the growth of South-South trade is also fairly well 
documented in the literature already. Again, however, the contribution of this thesis is to 
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systematically assess this growth over time, while factoring out the variables of economic size 
and geographical distance. By doing so, this thesis has established a stronger basis for 
claiming that there has been a transformation of the very nature of the international trade 
structure. By using the gravity model, this thesis shows that the dissolution of the core-
periphery trade structure is about more than the economic growth of countries in the global 
South. It is also about the directionality of their trade, which has finally managed to overcome 
the structural legacies of the colonial era. 
 This observation has interesting implications for the analysis of global economic 
governance. When the countries of the global South put forth demands for a New 
International Economic Order in the 1970s and 1980s, their demands were flatly rejected by 
the states of the North.119 The failure of the South to have a say in global economic 
governance during this period reflected their weak bargaining position in the world economy. 
The North was still at the absolute centre of international trade and could therefore dictate its 
terms unilaterally. The feudal interaction structure from the colonial period was largely still in 
place, and so were the power relations that came with it. 
 From that time onward, however, the states of the South have steadily built up their 
mutual trade relations and thereby broken out of their dependent predicament. This helps to 
explain the very different atmosphere in global economic governance in the new millennium. 
Negotiations at the World Trade Organization have ran into stalemate after stalemate as the 
traditional ‘quad’ – US, EU, Japan and Canada – has found that it is unable to run the show 
on its own. As Anthony Payne puts it, “[t]he days when trade was sorted out within a ‘rich 
men’s club’, outside which so-called developing countries quietly waited for crumbs, are 
comprehensively over.”120  
 This does not mean that all countries of the South always have the exact same interests 
and positions on trade issues.121 However, they do have a common interest in empowering the 
developing world more generally in matters of global economic governance.122 And this they 
have done. As early as 2005, Payne could write that  
the record of Seattle and Cancún, and even Doha up to a point, shows that the key non-‘quad’ 
countries – specifically those now grouped in the G20 – fight their positions much more 
                                                
119 Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, (London 2012), pp. 79-81. 
120 Anthony Payne, “How many Gs are there in ‘global governance’ after the crisis?” International Affairs 3 
(2010): p. 735. 
121 Anthony Payne, The Global Politics of Unequal Development, (Hampshire 2005), p. 197.  
122 Ramesh Thakur, “How representative are the BRICS?” Third World Quarterly 10 (2014): pp. 1795-1799. 
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determinedly and effectively than ever before and have just about enough clout to stop or hold 
up deals that are disproportionately tipped against their interests.123 
In the decade since, the relative weight of the global South in the world economy has only 
grown and so has trade amongst its countries. 
 According to Payne, “[w]hat counts in trade politics is share of the global market” and 
“the US, the EU and Japan continue to account for the bulk of world trade”.124 This view, 
however, misses the crucial importance of the structure of international trade in conferring 
influence on countries and regions. As this thesis has argued, power and influence in the 
world economy are not only about the absolute size of a country’s market – important as that 
may be. It is also about the strategic position of countries in the international trade structure. 
Therefore, when it comes to understanding the shifting balance of power in global economic 
governance in the last few decades, it is crucial to take into account the dissolution of the 
core-periphery structure.  
 It is therefore a mistake to look only at the relatively higher growth rates in the global 
South in order to gauge their growing influence vis-à-vis the North. Such a view will severely 
underestimate the actual shift that has taken place in the balance of power in the world 
economy. The North is losing its position, not only because it has lower GDP growth figures, 
but more importantly, because it has lost its strategic position as the centre of the world 
economy. The contribution of this thesis is to highlight this structural transformation to 
complement the already widely documented quantitative shift that has taken place. 
 
5.3.  China and the Global South 
As it turned out, the evidence was more equivocal on the third hypothesis: that the 
transformation of the trade structure can largely be attributed to China’s rise. Although the 
magnitude of China’s foreign trade is unparalled in the global South, the evidence suggests 
that the dissolution of the core-periphery trade structure is a more general phenomenon. It 
reflects growing trade relations between countries of the global South other than just China. 
This observation has a number of implications.  
 Most importantly, the findings do not suggest that China is assuming the structural 
position of a core vis-à-vis other countries in the global South. China is certainly the largest 
                                                
123 Payne, The Global Politics of Unequal Development, p. 197. It should be noted that the ‘G20’ referred to here 
is the G20 grouping of developing countries that worked together at WTO negotiations and not the newer G20 
that was established after the 2008 economic crisis to replace the G7/8.  
124 Payne, The Global Politics of Unequal Development, p. 197. 
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trading nation in the South, but the contemporary trade structure does not reflect a core-
periphery structure with China at its centre. States in the global South trade extensively with 
China, but also with each other and, of course, with the North. It therefore seems that the 
countries in the South have broken free from their structural dependence on the North without 
replacing it with an equivalent dependence on China. The evidence suggests that instead of 
being a new core, China is merely first among equals in a more balanced international trade 
structure.  
 However, this analysis must be qualified by noting that this research only looks at the 
overall structure of international trade but does not disaggregate its components. Indeed, as 
was discussed in chapter 2.4, some scholars point out that the composition of China’s trade 
with the South has quite similar characteristics as the South’s traditional trade with the core: 
the South exports primary products in exchange for manufactured goods. This, they might 
argue, is more important in terms of ‘dependence’ than the overall structure of international 
trade. However, as Giovanni Arrighi and Lu Zhang have noted, those who criticise China’s 
influence in the South with these arguments tend to “miss the ongoing reversal of the terms of 
trade between manufacturing and primary production” that has taken place.125  
 A central argument of dependency theory was that the price for primary products tended 
to fall over time relative to the price for manufactured goods, thereby undermining the 
South’s terms of trade.126 Arrighi and Zhang, however, argue that this logic is obsolete now 
that the South has increasingly industrialised and demand for primary products has grown 
across the board.127 Although Arrighi and Zhang do not address the issue of trade structure 
explicitly, their analysis is highly compatible with the account presented in this thesis. Terms 
of trade have, indeed, swung in favour of the global South in recent years, showing that there 
is nothing in the nature of primary products that necessitates falling terms of trade. A more 
plausible explanation is that this reversal is the result of the South’s stronger strategic position 
in international trade after the dissolution of the core-periphery structure. 
 Having rejected the view that China is simply becoming a new core, it is possible to 
turn to the opposite hypothesis: that China has similar interests as other developing countries 
and that its rise is therefore empowering for the global South more generally. This view, 
however, is more difficult to assess based on the evidence presented in this research. It is 
important to underline that the failure of the evidence to support one hypothesis, does not in 
                                                
125 Arrighi and Zhang, “Beyond the Washington Consensus”, p. 49. 
126 Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, pp. 8-14. 
127 Arrighi and Zhang, “Beyond the Washington Consensus”, p. 49. 
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itself constitute proof that the opposite is true. China may not be assuming the role of a 
traditional core country, but there may still be various conflicts of interests between it and 
other countries in the South in matters concerning the world economy. What is clear, 
however, is that the rise of China has provided important alternatives for other countries in 
the global South in terms of political and economic relations. And the benefits of these 
alternatives go beyond the direct gians that the South has from its dealings with China. In the 
words of Arrighi and Zhang, China has not only offered “Southern countries with better terms 
of trade, aid, and investment” than they had before, but by doing so it has “[intensified] 
competitive pressures on Northern countries to provide Southern countries with better terms 
than they otherwise would.”128 Again, what they are essentially saying is that the stronger 
strategic position of the South in the international trade structure has had a systemic influence 
on their terms of trade for the better.  
 In the end, the extent to which China’s rise will empower the global South more 
generally remains to be seen. But whatever the future holds, the rise of China has already 
contributed to the “subversion of the structural foundations of the global hierarchy of wealth 
and power”.129 And if we accept that the South was subordinated in this hierarchy, its demise 
at least gives cause for careful optimism.  
 
5.4.  Limitations of Aggregation 
Finally, it is in order to address some of the limitations of this research. Most importantly, the 
level of aggregation in the analysis is very high. The G77, which was used to define to South, 
includes 134 countries and nearly 80% of the world’s population. Many critics would rightly 
point out that there is substantial variation in the economic trajectory of different regions 
within this grouping during the period under study. Sweeping claims about the fate of the 
‘South’ must therefore be kept in their right perspective: they are true at a high level of 
abstraction, but also disguise wide variations at the regional and country level.  
 Indeed, some scholars argue that the South has largely ceased to be a meaningful term 
in analysing the world economy.130 Others argue that the South has effectively split in two: 
into “a developing world . . . (totaling about four billion people) whose economic growth rate 
has for the past several decades outpaced that of the developed world” and a group of “least-
                                                
128 Ibid., p. 49. 
129 Ibid., p. 49. 
130 Payne, The Global Politics of Unequal Development, pp. 231-233. 
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developed countries” whose GDP “has grown hardly at all in the past forty years”.131 This 
latter group is also known as the ‘bottom billion’.132 Still others choose to zoom in on the 
fastest growing economies in the South, collectively referred to as the ‘emerging 
economies’.133 All of these categories point to important variations within the contemporary 
South and this research would, indeed, have benefitted from a more disaggregated analysis of 
their development.  
 However, I would like to raise two arguments in defense of the thesis. Firstly, the 
failure to include more regional nuance in the analysis does not undermine the ability of the 
thesis to answer its main research questions: whether there was core-periphery structure and 
what happened to it. As the results showed, a core-periphery structure to international trade 
was clearly visible during the 1980s and early 1990s, but gradually gave way to a more 
balanced structure around the turn of the millennium.  
 Secondly, the variation and complexity within the contemporary global South is not 
inconsistent with the arguments of this thesis, but is in fact a logical consequence of its 
results. Again, the main finding of the thesis is that the core-periphery structure has dissolved. 
It is therefore only natural that the resulting structure would be something else than a simple 
core-periphery dichotomy. The contemporary South is, indeed, much more complicated and 
diverse than it was during colonial times and the decades following independence. And 
perhaps the North-South dichotomy is gradually becoming obsolete. However, in order to 
understand the contemporary world, we have to understand how we got here. And the 
dissolution of the core-periphery structure is an important part of that story. 
 
 
  
                                                
131 Dittmer, “China and the Developing World”, p. 1. 
132 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 
(Oxford 2007). 
133 Andrew Hurrell, “Rising powers and the emerging global order” The Globalization of World Politics, 6th 
edition, eds. Baylis, Smith and Owens, (Oxford 2014), pp. 90-93. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to investigate the development of the international trade structure during 
the period from 1980 to 2013. It did so by using a gravity model of international trade in order 
to detect systematic patterns over time. The research was guided by the hypothesis that 
legacies from the colonial era were still visible in patterns of international trade during the 
early part of the research period, but were gradually starting to fade away. Furthermore, it was 
assumed that the rapid economic rise of China during this period had a lot to do with this 
disruption. 
 As it turned out, the first two hypotheses were found to be true. International trade 
patterns during the 1980s and early 1990s reflected the structural legacy of the colonial period 
and the power asymmetries that came with it. The countries of the North occupied a pivotal 
position in the international trade structure, sitting at its centre like an octopus with its 
tentacles penetrating the various regions of the global South. The states in the South, 
however, were in a vulnerable position and more or less dependent on the North for their 
international trade. This ‘strategically stronger’ position of the North served to skew the terms 
of international trade in favour of the North in much the same way as it had during the 
colonial era. 
 However, as the century drew to a close, the states in the global South gradually 
escaped their complete dependence on the North by forging stronger trade relationships 
amongst themselves. The new millennium, thus, saw the emergence of a more balanced 
international trade structure, where the North had lost its preeminent position at its centre. 
Furthermore, China emerged during this period as the largest trading nation in the world, and 
today accounts for close to half of all South-South trade. This has generally strengthened the 
position of states in the South in the world economy by diversifying their export markets and 
enhancing their terms of trade. However, the dissolution of the core-periphery structure was 
not simply a reorientation towards China. The growth of South-South trade represents a 
system-wide transformation in which the developing world has generally strengthened its 
position.  
 It is impossible to know how the international trade structure would have developed in 
the absence of China. But the evidence shows that China is not assuming the position of a 
‘new core’ in the world economy. Its emergence as the largest trading nation in the world has 
coincided with a general trend towards a more balanced international trade structure. A 
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structure in which the countries of the global South occupy a better position than anytime 
before in the modern world.  
  For Giovanni Arrighi, the rise of China provides the possibility for a ‘new Bandung’, 
reinvigorating the Third World solidarity movement of the Cold War years.134 This time, 
however, it would not be based solely on political and ideological foundations but have a 
strong economic basis to work from. In fact, one might argue that the spectre of Bandung 
already looms large over the world economy in the new millennium. The colonial structure of 
international trade has finally dissolved and so have the power relations that came with it. 
Today, the global South does not have to plead with the North for a more just world order. It 
can set about constructing it itself.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Model summaries and coefficient statistics for the simple gravity models. These models were 
used to calculate the residuals used for indicator 1.  
 
 
Model Summary
Year Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1980 1
1981 1
1982 1
1983 1
1984 1
1985 1
1986 1
1987 1
1988 1
1989 1
1990 1
1991 1
1992 1
1993 1
1994 1
1995 1
1996 1
1997 1
1998 1
1999 1
2000 1
2001 1
2002 1
2003 1
2004 1
2005 1
2006 1
2007 1
2008 1
2009 1
2010 1
2011 1
2012 1
2013 1
,757a ,572 ,572 2,16490
,755a ,569 ,569 2,18782
,763a ,582 ,581 2,14736
,761a ,579 ,579 2,14230
,762a ,580 ,580 2,13621
,764a ,583 ,583 2,11898
,774a ,599 ,599 2,11582
,776a ,602 ,602 2,13264
,781a ,610 ,610 2,15766
,780a ,608 ,608 2,20020
,779a ,607 ,607 2,28831
,788a ,621 ,621 2,20315
,788a ,622 ,622 2,20410
,790a ,624 ,624 2,22436
,799a ,639 ,638 2,20697
,803a ,645 ,645 2,20998
,808a ,652 ,652 2,20082
,810b ,656 ,656 2,20458
,806b ,649 ,649 2,21031
,809a ,654 ,654 2,24756
,801a ,642 ,642 2,32046
,802a ,644 ,644 2,33282
,800b ,640 ,640 2,35278
,801b ,642 ,642 2,36821
,798b ,638 ,637 2,42434
,794a ,630 ,630 2,47589
,792b ,628 ,628 2,51602
,792b ,627 ,627 2,52278
,787b ,620 ,620 2,56944
,790b ,624 ,624 2,52573
,789b ,622 ,622 2,57158
,788b ,620 ,620 2,59616
,784b ,615 ,615 2,60909
,783b ,614 ,614 2,61852
Predictors: (Constant), ln_distance_cap, ln_importer_GDP, ln_partner_GDPa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ln_distance_cap, ln_partner_GDP, ln_importer_GDPb. 
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standard
ized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1980 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1981 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1982 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1983 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1984 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1985 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1986 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1987 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1988 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1989 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
6,453 ,287 22,512 ,000
,895 ,011 ,599 78,736 ,000
,905 ,012 ,562 73,225 ,000
-1 ,077 ,029 - ,280 -36,953 ,000
6,726 ,272 24,714 ,000
,870 ,011 ,598 81,799 ,000
,912 ,012 ,572 77,541 ,000
-1 ,089 ,028 - ,283 -38,822 ,000
7,005 ,266 26,322 ,000
,861 ,010 ,599 82,631 ,000
,922 ,012 ,583 79,699 ,000
-1 ,124 ,028 - ,294 -40,690 ,000
6,853 ,270 25,381 ,000
,883 ,011 ,603 82,437 ,000
,920 ,012 ,578 78,314 ,000
-1 ,132 ,028 - ,298 -40,951 ,000
6,882 ,267 25,808 ,000
,877 ,011 ,603 82,769 ,000
,922 ,012 ,585 79,489 ,000
-1 ,127 ,027 - ,297 -41,009 ,000
6,725 ,265 25,349 ,000
,875 ,011 ,599 82,947 ,000
,936 ,011 ,599 82,156 ,000
-1 ,125 ,027 - ,296 -41,323 ,000
5,998 ,263 22,787 ,000
,890 ,010 ,614 87,320 ,000
,962 ,011 ,612 86,477 ,000
-1 ,112 ,027 - ,286 -41,236 ,000
6,146 ,259 23,725 ,000
,883 ,010 ,614 88,619 ,000
,960 ,011 ,624 89,218 ,000
-1 ,132 ,027 - ,289 -42,150 ,000
6,072 ,258 23,493 ,000
,883 ,010 ,616 91,515 ,000
,981 ,010 ,642 94,831 ,000
-1 ,160 ,027 - ,288 -43,704 ,000
6,604 ,262 25,192 ,000
,883 ,010 ,607 91,163 ,000
1,006 ,010 ,658 98,465 ,000
-1 ,260 ,027 - ,304 -47,139 ,000
6,352 ,266 23,876 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standard
ized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1990 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1991 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1992 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1993 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1994 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1995 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1996 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1997 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1998 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
1999 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
6,352 ,266 23,876 ,000
,896 ,010 ,601 92,682 ,000
1,039 ,010 ,665 102,124 ,000
-1 ,301 ,027 - ,300 -47,715 ,000
6,396 ,252 25,337 ,000
,884 ,009 ,606 94,832 ,000
1,047 ,010 ,690 107,596 ,000
-1 ,300 ,026 - ,305 -49,218 ,000
6,432 ,240 26,797 ,000
,883 ,009 ,603 98,816 ,000
1,038 ,009 ,689 112,830 ,000
-1 ,297 ,025 - ,305 -51,569 ,000
6,550 ,226 29,023 ,000
,890 ,009 ,589 102,131 ,000
1,059 ,009 ,689 119,475 ,000
-1 ,355 ,024 - ,322 -57,448 ,000
6,188 ,215 28,777 ,000
,927 ,008 ,607 111,728 ,000
1,059 ,008 ,680 125,005 ,000
-1 ,364 ,023 - ,321 -60,410 ,000
5,730 ,208 27,592 ,000
,932 ,008 ,594 116,255 ,000
1,080 ,008 ,676 131,985 ,000
-1 ,358 ,021 - ,317 -63,277 ,000
5,503 ,205 26,785 ,000
,929 ,008 ,583 117,209 ,000
1,112 ,008 ,686 137,879 ,000
-1 ,381 ,021 - ,319 -65,500 ,000
5,119 ,202 25,333 ,000
,950 ,008 ,578 120,614 ,000
1,116 ,008 ,681 142,111 ,000
-1 ,364 ,021 - ,312 -66,383 ,000
4,955 ,201 24,612 ,000
,924 ,008 ,556 117,151 ,000
1,131 ,008 ,686 144,637 ,000
-1 ,325 ,020 - ,305 -65,717 ,000
4,751 ,202 23,528 ,000
,945 ,008 ,562 121,777 ,000
1,151 ,008 ,680 147,146 ,000
-1 ,365 ,020 - ,306 -67,650 ,000
5,329 ,203 26,221 ,000
Page 2
 63 
Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standard
ized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
2000 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2001 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2002 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2003 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2004 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2005 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2006 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2007 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2008 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2009 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
5,329 ,203 26,221 ,000
,944 ,008 ,552 120,698 ,000
1,141 ,008 ,674 147,212 ,000
-1 ,419 ,020 - ,312 -69,617 ,000
5,174 ,204 25,372 ,000
,937 ,008 ,539 119,676 ,000
1,164 ,008 ,679 150,649 ,000
-1 ,421 ,020 - ,309 -69,849 ,000
4,913 ,206 23,868 ,000
,926 ,008 ,529 117,708 ,000
1,177 ,008 ,682 151,952 ,000
-1 ,402 ,020 - ,302 -68,676 ,000
4,700 ,207 22,654 ,000
,934 ,008 ,532 119,714 ,000
1,186 ,008 ,679 153,007 ,000
-1 ,418 ,020 - ,302 -69,604 ,000
4,557 ,213 21,419 ,000
,929 ,008 ,520 117,424 ,000
1,202 ,008 ,678 153,115 ,000
-1 ,432 ,021 - ,300 -69,122 ,000
4,339 ,217 19,988 ,000
,920 ,008 ,508 114,490 ,000
1,217 ,008 ,677 152,493 ,000
-1 ,429 ,021 - ,295 -67,837 ,000
3,831 ,221 17,363 ,000
,922 ,008 ,501 113,385 ,000
1,236 ,008 ,676 153,040 ,000
-1 ,413 ,021 - ,287 -66,202 ,000
3,779 ,222 16,991 ,000
,915 ,008 ,494 112,398 ,000
1,228 ,008 ,671 152,504 ,000
-1 ,407 ,021 - ,285 -65,921 ,000
3,579 ,228 15,715 ,000
,903 ,008 ,481 108,997 ,000
1,246 ,008 ,671 152,184 ,000
-1 ,407 ,022 - ,282 -65,013 ,000
3,634 ,223 16,268 ,000
,908 ,008 ,484 110,188 ,000
1,263 ,008 ,676 154,056 ,000
-1 ,449 ,021 - ,294 -68,060 ,000
3,602 ,226 15,964 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standard
ized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
2010 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2011 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2012 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
2013 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
3,602 ,226 15,964 ,000
,916 ,008 ,483 110,398 ,000
1,269 ,008 ,675 154,510 ,000
-1 ,475 ,022 - ,293 -68,115 ,000
3,577 ,229 15,610 ,000
,919 ,008 ,482 110,023 ,000
1,273 ,008 ,674 153,924 ,000
-1 ,490 ,022 - ,293 -67,914 ,000
3,483 ,230 15,140 ,000
,919 ,008 ,479 108,876 ,000
1,271 ,008 ,673 153,050 ,000
-1 ,478 ,022 - ,291 -67,178 ,000
3,509 ,231 15,176 ,000
,920 ,008 ,477 108,609 ,000
1,274 ,008 ,670 152,516 ,000
-1 ,496 ,022 - ,293 -67,802 ,000
Dependent Variable: ln_flow_valuea. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Model summaries and coefficient statistics for the models when a dummy variable for South-
South trade is included. The name of the South-South trade dummy variable is ‘G77_intra’. 
 
 
Model Summary
Year Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1980 1
1981 1
1982 1
1983 1
1984 1
1985 1
1986 1
1987 1
1988 1
1989 1
1990 1
1991 1
1992 1
1993 1
1994 1
1995 1
1996 1
1997 1
1998 1
1999 1
2000 1
2001 1
2002 1
2003 1
2004 1
2005 1
2006 1
2007 1
2008 1
2009 1
2010 1
2011 1
2012 1
2013 1
,764a ,583 ,583 2,13727
,760a ,578 ,578 2,16590
,767a ,588 ,588 2,13147
,766a ,587 ,587 2,12164
,767b ,588 ,587 2,11820
,768a ,590 ,589 2,10270
,778a ,605 ,605 2,10169
,779a ,607 ,607 2,12111
,783a ,613 ,612 2,15064
,781a ,609 ,609 2,19559
,780a ,608 ,608 2,28593
,788a ,622 ,622 2,20044
,789a ,622 ,622 2,20314
,791a ,625 ,625 2,22203
,799a ,639 ,638 2,20680
,803a ,645 ,645 2,21006
,808a ,652 ,652 2,20080
,810a ,656 ,656 2,20444
,806a ,649 ,649 2,21037
,809a ,654 ,654 2,24740
,801a ,642 ,642 2,32052
,803a ,644 ,644 2,33271
,800a ,640 ,640 2,35188
,802a ,643 ,643 2,36571
,800a ,639 ,639 2,41825
,795a ,631 ,631 2,47143
,793a ,629 ,629 2,51087
,793a ,629 ,629 2,51525
,788b ,622 ,622 2,56334
,791b ,625 ,625 2,52159
,790b ,623 ,623 2,56785
,788b ,621 ,621 2,59311
,784b ,615 ,615 2,60801
,783b ,614 ,614 2,61776
Predictors: (Constant), G77_intra, ln_distance_cap, ln_partner_GDP, ln_importer_GDPa. 
Predictors: (Constant), G77_intra, ln_distance_cap, ln_importer_GDP, ln_partner_GDPb. 
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1980 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1981 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1982 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1983 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1984 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1985 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1986 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
8,363 ,313 26,7 ,000
,834 ,012 ,558 69,4 ,000
,850 ,013 ,528 66,3 ,000
-1 ,131 ,029 - ,294 - 3 9 ,000
- ,818 ,058 - ,117 - 1 4 ,000
8,383 ,298 28,2 ,000
,821 ,011 ,564 73,4 ,000
,864 ,012 ,542 70,7 ,000
-1 ,140 ,028 - ,296 - 4 1 ,000
- ,728 ,056 - ,103 - 1 3 ,000
8,402 ,292 28,8 ,000
,820 ,011 ,570 74,5 ,000
,881 ,012 ,557 73,0 ,000
-1 ,166 ,028 - ,305 - 4 2 ,000
- ,619 ,055 - ,088 - 1 1 ,000
8,465 ,296 28,6 ,000
,835 ,011 ,570 74,0 ,000
,872 ,012 ,548 71,4 ,000
-1 ,181 ,028 - ,310 - 4 3 ,000
- ,704 ,055 - ,100 - 1 3 ,000
8,365 ,292 28,6 ,000
,834 ,011 ,574 75,0 ,000
,878 ,012 ,557 72,7 ,000
-1 ,173 ,028 - ,309 - 4 3 ,000
- ,657 ,055 - ,094 - 1 2 ,000
8,173 ,292 28,0 ,000
,832 ,011 ,570 74,7 ,000
,894 ,012 ,572 75,2 ,000
-1 ,170 ,027 - ,308 - 4 3 ,000
- ,625 ,054 - ,089 - 1 1 ,000
7,413 ,292 25,4 ,000
,846 ,011 ,583 77,6 ,000
,919 ,012 ,584 78,1 ,000 Page 1
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1986 1
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1987 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1988 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1989 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1990 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1991 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1992 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
,919 ,012 ,584 78,1 ,000
-1 ,151 ,027 - ,296 - 4 3 ,000
- ,590 ,055 - ,083 - 1 1 ,000
7,450 ,290 25,7 ,000
,842 ,011 ,586 78,5 ,000
,920 ,011 ,598 80,4 ,000
-1 ,168 ,027 - ,298 - 4 3 ,000
- ,538 ,055 - ,075 - 9 , 8 ,000
7,083 ,288 24,6 ,000
,851 ,010 ,594 81,5 ,000
,950 ,011 ,622 86,2 ,000
-1 ,187 ,027 - ,294 - 4 4 ,000
- ,422 ,054 - ,058 - 7 , 8 ,000
7,410 ,290 25,6 ,000
,858 ,010 ,589 82,1 ,000
,981 ,011 ,642 90,3 ,000
-1 ,280 ,027 - ,309 - 4 8 ,000
- ,341 ,053 - ,046 - 6 , 4 ,000
6,959 ,295 23,6 ,000
,877 ,011 ,588 83,2 ,000
1,020 ,011 ,653 93,6 ,000
-1 ,315 ,027 - ,303 - 4 8 ,000
- ,254 ,054 - ,033 - 4 , 7 ,000
7,016 ,280 25,1 ,000
,864 ,010 ,593 85,5 ,000
1,028 ,010 ,677 98,6 ,000
-1 ,314 ,027 - ,309 - 5 0 ,000
- ,262 ,051 - ,035 - 5 , 1 ,000
6,763 ,260 26,0 ,000
,871 ,010 ,595 90,9 ,000
1,027 ,010 ,682 105 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1992 1
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1993 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1994 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1995 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1996 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1997 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1998 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
1,027 ,010 ,682 105 ,000
-1 ,301 ,025 - ,307 - 5 2 ,000
- ,158 ,049 - ,021 - 3 , 3 ,001
6,939 ,238 29,2 ,000
,876 ,009 ,579 95,8 ,000
1,045 ,009 ,680 113 ,000
-1 ,358 ,024 - ,323 - 5 8 ,000
- ,236 ,046 - ,031 - 5 , 2 ,000
6,311 ,226 27,9 ,000
,922 ,009 ,604 105 ,000
1,055 ,009 ,678 119 ,000
-1 ,365 ,023 - ,321 - 6 0 ,000
- ,077 ,044 - ,010 - 1 , 8 ,078
5,718 ,217 26,3 ,000
,932 ,008 ,595 110 ,000
1,081 ,009 ,676 127 ,000
-1 ,358 ,021 - ,317 - 6 3 ,000
,008 ,042 ,001 ,182 ,856
5,574 ,215 26,0 ,000
,926 ,008 ,581 111 ,000
1,109 ,008 ,685 132 ,000
-1 ,381 ,021 - ,319 - 6 5 ,000
- ,047 ,041 - ,006 - 1 , 1 ,252
5,223 ,210 24,8 ,000
,945 ,008 ,576 115 ,000
1,112 ,008 ,678 136 ,000
-1 ,364 ,021 - ,312 - 6 6 ,000
- ,071 ,040 - ,009 - 1 , 8 ,076
4,974 ,210 23,7 ,000
,923 ,008 ,555 112 ,000
1,130 ,008 ,685 138 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1998 1
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1999 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2000 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2001 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2002 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2003 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2004 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
1,130 ,008 ,685 138 ,000
-1 ,325 ,020 - ,305 - 6 6 ,000
- ,012 ,039 - ,002 - , 3 1 ,754
4,647 ,209 22,2 ,000
,950 ,008 ,565 117 ,000
1,155 ,008 ,683 141 ,000
-1 ,366 ,020 - ,307 - 6 8 ,000
,072 ,039 ,009 1,85 ,064
5,328 ,211 25,3 ,000
,944 ,008 ,552 115 ,000
1,141 ,008 ,674 141 ,000
-1 ,419 ,020 - ,312 - 7 0 ,000
,000 ,039 ,000 ,006 ,995
5,080 ,212 24,0 ,000
,941 ,008 ,542 115 ,000
1,167 ,008 ,681 145 ,000
-1 ,422 ,020 - ,309 - 7 0 ,000
,064 ,039 ,008 1,66 ,098
4,683 ,214 21,9 ,000
,935 ,008 ,534 114 ,000
1,186 ,008 ,687 147 ,000
-1 ,403 ,020 - ,302 - 6 9 ,000
,151 ,039 ,018 3,91 ,000
4,303 ,216 19,9 ,000
,950 ,008 ,541 116 ,000
1,202 ,008 ,688 148 ,000
-1 ,421 ,020 - ,303 - 7 0 ,000
,250 ,039 ,030 6,44 ,000
3,918 ,222 17,7 ,000
,955 ,008 ,534 115 ,000
1,226 ,008 ,692 149 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
2004 1
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2005 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2006 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2007 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2008 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2009 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2010 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
1,226 ,008 ,692 149 ,000
-1 ,436 ,021 - ,300 - 6 9 ,000
,391 ,039 ,046 9,95 ,000
3,787 ,226 16,7 ,000
,942 ,008 ,521 112 ,000
1,238 ,008 ,689 148 ,000
-1 ,432 ,021 - ,296 - 6 8 ,000
,338 ,040 ,040 8,48 ,000
3,253 ,229 14,2 ,000
,944 ,008 ,513 111 ,000
1,257 ,008 ,687 150 ,000
-1 ,416 ,021 - ,288 - 6 6 ,000
,363 ,040 ,042 9,10 ,000
3,048 ,232 13,2 ,000
,943 ,009 ,509 111 ,000
1,255 ,008 ,686 149 ,000
-1 ,410 ,021 - ,286 - 6 6 ,000
,441 ,040 ,051 11,0 ,000
2,925 ,237 12,4 ,000
,927 ,009 ,494 108 ,000
1,270 ,009 ,684 149 ,000
-1 ,410 ,022 - ,283 - 6 5 ,000
,398 ,040 ,046 9,88 ,000
3,118 ,232 13,5 ,000
,927 ,009 ,494 108 ,000
1,283 ,009 ,687 150 ,000
-1 ,452 ,021 - ,294 - 6 8 ,000
,324 ,039 ,038 8,23 ,000
3,138 ,233 13,5 ,000
,933 ,009 ,492 109 ,000
1,286 ,009 ,684 151 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
2010 1
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2011 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2012 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
2013 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
G77_intra
1,286 ,009 ,684 151 ,000
-1 ,478 ,022 - ,294 - 6 8 ,000
,308 ,040 ,035 7,79 ,000
3,165 ,236 13,4 ,000
,934 ,009 ,490 108 ,000
1,289 ,009 ,682 151 ,000
-1 ,494 ,022 - ,293 - 6 8 ,000
,280 ,040 ,032 7,03 ,000
3,241 ,237 13,7 ,000
,928 ,009 ,484 107 ,000
1,280 ,009 ,678 149 ,000
-1 ,481 ,022 - ,291 - 6 7 ,000
,169 ,040 ,019 4,27 ,000
3,299 ,238 13,8 ,000
,928 ,009 ,481 106 ,000
1,282 ,009 ,674 148 ,000
-1 ,498 ,022 - ,294 - 6 8 ,000
,144 ,040 ,016 3,62 ,000
Dependent Variable: ln_flow_valuea. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Model summaries and coefficient statistics for the models when a dummy variable for trade 
involving the North is included. The name of the North trade dummy variable is 
‘North_at_all’. 
 
 
Model Summary
Year Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1980 1
1981 1
1982 1
1983 1
1984 1
1985 1
1986 1
1987 1
1988 1
1989 1
1990 1
1991 1
1992 1
1993 1
1994 1
1995 1
1996 1
1997 1
1998 1
1999 1
2000 1
2001 1
2002 1
2003 1
2004 1
2005 1
2006 1
2007 1
2008 1
2009 1
2010 1
2011 1
2012 1
2013 1
,773a ,598 ,598 2,09866
,771b ,594 ,594 2,12551
,776a ,602 ,602 2,09442
,775a ,601 ,601 2,08514
,775a ,601 ,601 2,08298
,777a ,603 ,603 2,06686
,785a ,617 ,617 2,06982
,787a ,620 ,619 2,08643
,789a ,623 ,623 2,12167
,786a ,618 ,618 2,17158
,784a ,615 ,615 2,26677
,790a ,625 ,625 2,19165
,790a ,624 ,623 2,19881
,791a ,626 ,626 2,21858
,800a ,640 ,639 2,20375
,803a ,645 ,645 2,20873
,809a ,654 ,654 2,19515
,811a ,658 ,658 2,19905
,806a ,650 ,650 2,20640
,809a ,655 ,655 2,24463
,802c ,644 ,644 2,31378
,804c ,646 ,646 2,32582
,801a ,641 ,641 2,34935
,802c ,643 ,643 2,36598
,799c ,638 ,638 2,42341
,794c ,631 ,631 2,47286
,793c ,629 ,628 2,51314
,792c ,628 ,628 2,52108
,788c ,621 ,621 2,56610
,791c ,626 ,625 2,52147
,790c ,624 ,624 2,56694
,788c ,622 ,622 2,59127
,786c ,617 ,617 2,60252
,785c ,616 ,616 2,61027
Predictors: (Constant), North_at_all, ln_distance_cap, ln_partner_GDP, ln_importer_GDPa. 
Predictors: (Constant), North_at_all, ln_partner_GDP, ln_distance_cap, ln_importer_GDPb. 
Predictors: (Constant), North_at_all, ln_distance_cap, ln_importer_GDP, ln_partner_GDPc. 
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standar
dized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1980 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1981 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1982 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1983 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1984 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1985 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1986 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1987 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
8,123 ,288 28,21 ,000
,808 ,012 ,541 69,09 ,000
,837 ,012 ,520 67,70 ,000
-1 ,175 ,029 - ,306 -41 ,1 ,000
1,201 ,054 ,177 22,19 ,000
8,277 ,273 30,28 ,000
,796 ,011 ,547 73,34 ,000
,848 ,012 ,532 71,93 ,000
-1 ,191 ,028 - ,309 -43 ,1 ,000
1,159 ,052 ,170 22,37 ,000
8,418 ,268 31,36 ,000
,795 ,011 ,553 74,47 ,000
,861 ,012 ,545 73,81 ,000
-1 ,216 ,027 - ,318 -44 ,5 ,000
1,065 ,052 ,157 20,65 ,000
8,354 ,272 30,71 ,000
,812 ,011 ,554 74,18 ,000
,855 ,012 ,537 72,35 ,000
-1 ,228 ,027 - ,323 -45 ,0 ,000
1,105 ,052 ,163 21,42 ,000
8,293 ,269 30,85 ,000
,812 ,011 ,559 75,16 ,000
,860 ,012 ,546 73,56 ,000
-1 ,220 ,027 - ,322 -44 ,9 ,000
1,065 ,051 ,157 20,73 ,000
8,164 ,268 30,47 ,000
,807 ,011 ,553 74,74 ,000
,875 ,012 ,559 76,07 ,000
-1 ,217 ,027 - ,320 -45 ,2 ,000
1,050 ,051 ,156 20,75 ,000
7,470 ,268 27,86 ,000
,819 ,011 ,565 77,24 ,000
,895 ,011 ,569 78,43 ,000
-1 ,191 ,027 - ,307 -44 ,7 ,000
1,002 ,051 ,146 19,67 ,000
7,631 ,264 28,88 ,000
,810 ,010 ,564 77,82 ,000
,889 ,011 ,578 80,03 ,000
-1 ,206 ,027 - ,307 -45 ,4 ,000
1,011 ,051 ,147 19,87 ,000
7,374 ,264 27,88 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standar
dized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1988 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1989 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1990 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1991 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1992 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1993 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1994 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1995 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
7,374 ,264 27,88 ,000
,818 ,010 ,570 80,45 ,000
,921 ,011 ,602 85,87 ,000
-1 ,225 ,026 - ,304 -46 ,5 ,000
,896 ,050 ,127 17,82 ,000
7,739 ,268 28,85 ,000
,826 ,010 ,568 80,98 ,000
,953 ,011 ,623 89,94 ,000
-1 ,317 ,027 - ,318 -49 ,5 ,000
,799 ,050 ,112 16,03 ,000
7,409 ,274 27,02 ,000
,842 ,010 ,565 81,50 ,000
,988 ,011 ,632 92,32 ,000
-1 ,347 ,027 - ,311 -49 ,5 ,000
,716 ,051 ,097 13,98 ,000
7,185 ,262 27,39 ,000
,845 ,010 ,579 84,34 ,000
1,010 ,010 ,665 97,89 ,000
-1 ,335 ,026 - ,314 -50 ,4 ,000
,518 ,050 ,072 10,41 ,000
6,925 ,249 27,86 ,000
,856 ,010 ,585 89,07 ,000
1,012 ,010 ,672 102,9 ,000
-1 ,314 ,025 - ,310 -52 ,2 ,000
,351 ,047 ,049 7,399 ,000
6,929 ,230 30,14 ,000
,866 ,009 ,573 94,23 ,000
1,037 ,009 ,674 111,9 ,000
-1 ,368 ,024 - ,326 -58 ,0 ,000
,357 ,044 ,049 8,093 ,000
6,478 ,220 29,50 ,000
,908 ,009 ,595 103,3 ,000
1,042 ,009 ,670 117,5 ,000
-1 ,374 ,023 - ,323 -60 ,8 ,000
,267 ,042 ,036 6,317 ,000
5,909 ,212 27,88 ,000
,920 ,009 ,587 108,1 ,000
1,069 ,009 ,669 124,6 ,000
-1 ,363 ,021 - ,318 -63 ,4 ,000
,169 ,040 ,023 4,183 ,000
5,874 ,209 28,09 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standar
dized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1996 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1997 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1998 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
1999 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2000 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2001 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2002 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2003 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
5,874 ,209 28,09 ,000
,904 ,008 ,567 107,9 ,000
1,089 ,008 ,672 128,7 ,000
-1 ,389 ,021 - ,321 -66 ,0 ,000
,349 ,039 ,047 8,868 ,000
5,466 ,205 26,63 ,000
,925 ,008 ,563 111,3 ,000
1,093 ,008 ,667 132,4 ,000
-1 ,369 ,021 - ,313 -66 ,8 ,000
,345 ,038 ,046 9,004 ,000
5,254 ,205 25,67 ,000
,903 ,008 ,543 108,3 ,000
1,110 ,008 ,673 134,5 ,000
-1 ,328 ,020 - ,306 -66 ,0 ,000
,291 ,038 ,039 7,721 ,000
5,004 ,205 24,40 ,000
,927 ,008 ,551 112,7 ,000
1,133 ,008 ,669 136,9 ,000
-1 ,366 ,020 - ,307 -67 ,8 ,000
,255 ,038 ,033 6,757 ,000
5,723 ,206 27,75 ,000
,916 ,008 ,536 110,7 ,000
1,113 ,008 ,657 135,7 ,000
-1 ,421 ,020 - ,313 -69 ,9 ,000
,389 ,038 ,050 10,27 ,000
5,583 ,207 26,98 ,000
,908 ,008 ,523 109,7 ,000
1,135 ,008 ,662 138,8 ,000
-1 ,423 ,020 - ,309 -70 ,2 ,000
,399 ,038 ,051 10,60 ,000
5,222 ,210 24,91 ,000
,904 ,008 ,516 108,3 ,000
1,157 ,008 ,670 140,5 ,000
-1 ,405 ,020 - ,303 -68 ,9 ,000
,283 ,038 ,036 7,468 ,000
4,968 ,212 23,45 ,000
,916 ,008 ,521 110,0 ,000
1,169 ,008 ,669 141,1 ,000
-1 ,420 ,020 - ,303 -69 ,7 ,000
,232 ,038 ,029 6,091 ,000
4,739 ,218 21,79 ,000
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Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standar
dized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
2004 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2005 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2006 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2007 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2008 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2009 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2010 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2011 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
4,739 ,218 21,79 ,000
,917 ,008 ,514 108,7 ,000
1,190 ,008 ,671 142,1 ,000
-1 ,434 ,021 - ,300 -69 ,2 ,000
,154 ,039 ,019 3,987 ,000
4,659 ,222 21,03 ,000
,899 ,009 ,497 105,5 ,000
1,197 ,008 ,666 141,2 ,000
-1 ,432 ,021 - ,296 -68 ,0 ,000
,273 ,039 ,034 7,011 ,000
4,134 ,225 18,39 ,000
,903 ,009 ,490 105,3 ,000
1,217 ,009 ,665 142,6 ,000
-1 ,416 ,021 - ,288 -66 ,4 ,000
,267 ,039 ,032 6,836 ,000
4,023 ,227 17,72 ,000
,901 ,009 ,486 104,7 ,000
1,214 ,009 ,663 142,6 ,000
-1 ,410 ,021 - ,286 -66 ,1 ,000
,207 ,039 ,025 5,297 ,000
3,908 ,232 16,86 ,000
,883 ,009 ,470 101,5 ,000
1,226 ,009 ,660 142,2 ,000
-1 ,410 ,022 - ,283 -65 ,2 ,000
,288 ,039 ,035 7,334 ,000
3,998 ,227 17,59 ,000
,885 ,009 ,472 102,5 ,000
1,241 ,009 ,664 143,8 ,000
-1 ,451 ,021 - ,294 -68 ,3 ,000
,322 ,039 ,039 8,348 ,000
3,955 ,229 17,28 ,000
,894 ,009 ,471 103,3 ,000
1,246 ,009 ,663 144,9 ,000
-1 ,477 ,022 - ,293 -68 ,3 ,000
,336 ,039 ,040 8,688 ,000
3,924 ,232 16,91 ,000
,897 ,009 ,471 103,3 ,000
1,251 ,009 ,662 145,0 ,000
-1 ,493 ,022 - ,293 -68 ,1 ,000
,344 ,039 ,041 8,870 ,000
3,867 ,232 16,63 ,000
Page 4
 77 
 
 
 
 
 
General note on the appendices: 
 
In order to keep the appendices within reasonable length, they only include the model 
summaries as well as the coefficient statistics. Other tables such as the ANOVA or residual 
statistics can be provided upon request from the author.  
 
Coefficientsa
Year Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standar
dized 
Coefficie
nts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
2012 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
2013 1 (Constant)
ln_importer_GDP
ln_partner_GDP
ln_distance_cap
North_at_all
3,867 ,232 16,63 ,000
,895 ,009 ,467 102,4 ,000
1,246 ,009 ,660 144,3 ,000
-1 ,481 ,022 - ,291 -67 ,5 ,000
,397 ,039 ,047 10,27 ,000
3,945 ,234 16,89 ,000
,893 ,009 ,463 101,8 ,000
1,246 ,009 ,655 143,5 ,000
-1 ,499 ,022 - ,294 -68 ,1 ,000
,446 ,039 ,053 11,51 ,000
Dependent Variable: ln_flow_valuea. 
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